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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the impact of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), a prominent
place-based development policy in India.
The first chapter studies the impact of SEZs on general economic activity as
proxied by satellite lights data. Using newly assembled data on geocoded SEZ-level
information and a thirteen-year panel data of 100,000 one-square-kilometer cells, it
establishes that SEZs cause a significant increase in local economic activity up to a
distance of 5 kilometers from the zones. The net effect is positive up to 20 kilometers
from the zones, comparable in size to Indian districts.
The second chapter analyzes the forces behind the increase in economic activ-
ity recorded in Chapter 1. Using nationally representative data on informal and
formal sector firms and comparing current and future districts of SEZ operation in
a difference-in-differences framework, the analysis produces evidence of a structural
transformation in the local economy. While firms in the formal sector gain in size and
productivity, SEZs crowd out economic activity from the informal sector evidenced
by substantial decreases in informal sector employment, production and productivity.
These trends are accompanied by non-uniform wage effects on workers in the local
economy with only the higher end of the income and education distributions gaining
significantly.
v
The third chapter sheds more light on the mechanism that drives the opposite
effects produced by SEZs on the two sectors of the Indian economy. Using measures
of product quality and an index for the relative importance of industries in the supply
chain, it finds that SEZs exert an increase in the demand for quality inputs from the
local economy. This differentially hurts informal industries that are input suppliers.
Secondly, evidence from a unique data-set on firm registrations in the state of Tamil
Nadu suggests that increased formalization in the local economy is not brought about
by an increase in informal firms registering into the formal sector. It is rather driven
by a reduction in their registration rate and shutting down. Given that this sector
is a major employer, this result raises concerns about inclusiveness in the growth
produced by such a large-scale place-based policy.
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1Chapter 1
The Effect of Indian Special Economic
Zones (SEZs): Evidence from Spatial and
Temporal Patterns of Economic Activity
1.1 Introduction
What is the effect on the regional economy when an industrial zone locates within
it, playing host to a cluster of large and highly productive firms? The question
is an important one, given that place-based development programs such as Special
Economic Zones (SEZs) are an increasingly popular policy tool employed to induce
economic development in a region. India introduced the 2005 Special Economic Zones
(SEZ) Act as one of the biggest pushes to industrial development in its history. For
over ten years from 2005, the country invested 0.5 per cent of its annual GDP into
this program, amounting to 62 billion US dollars- substantial by both Indian and
international standards.1 221 SEZs began operation across the nation, attracting
1According to Shenoy (2016), roughly half the amount was spent over a decade by the Indian
government for financing infrastructural development and providing tax exemptions to all firms
in two eastern Indian states. Kline and Moretti (2013) and Busso et al. (2013) also estimate the
investments in the Tennessee Valley Authority program and the Empowerment Zones to be lower-
around 20 billion and 3 billion dollars respectively.
2firms through tax exemptions, infrastructural benefits and regulatory concessions,
directly employing 1.4 million people and contributing to almost one-third of the
annual national exports.2 However, the observed economic activity of SEZs alone is
not evidence of the policy’s success. The chief concern is that these observed benefits
to regions receiving SEZs could be offset by losses elsewhere in the economy through
resource relocations. This would produce little, if any, aggregate gains at considerable
costs.
The literature on such place-based development policies measures their cost-effectiveness
based on the programs’ ability to form linkages with the local economy.3 Stronger
linkages between highly productive and export-oriented firms locating within zones,
and the non-zonal economy, can increase local competition, produce denser input and
labor markets and knowledge spillovers among firms and workers. These can drive
long-run development and net positive effects even at an aggregate regional level.
Given the magnitude of investment into the Indian SEZ policy, it is important to
understand if it had a similar influence on the surrounding economy and to evaluate
the extent of its benefits.
We provide one of the first empirical evaluations of the influence of Indian SEZs on
the non-SEZ economy. In doing so, we add to the limited understanding of the effects
of place-based development policies in the context of developing countries. Using the
stages of approvals for SEZs as a source of quasi-experimental variation and a panel
dataset on satellite lights, our study reveals a persistent increase in general economic
activity, as proxied by nighttime lights, in SEZ neighborhoods up to 5 kilometers in
radius. We also analyze the impact at a range of distances around the SEZs to find
2Statistics sourced from the Ministry of Commerce website and Mukherjee and Bhardwaj (2016).
3SeeFarole et al. (2011) and Aggarwal (2011) for a discussion.
3that farther away areas, up to 20 kilometers, are not significantly hurt. Thus SEZs
seem to produce net positive effects on areas several times the size of the zones, and
we find little evidence of zero-sum relocation at least at this level of aggregation.
Furthermore, using gridded population data in conjunction with satellite lights data,
we find that the general increase in economic activity is only partially explained by
increases in population density, prompting questions on the nature of the economic
growth which is further explored in the next chapters.
The challenge to our identification strategy comes from the non-random nature of
program location. This is a common concern for studies analyzing place-based de-
velopment policies. In order to credibly isolate the effect of SEZs on the regional
economy, we exploit a source of variation in the government-regulated approval pro-
cess for SEZs. We consider only those regions surrounding SEZs that have reached
the penultimate stage of approval before beginning operation. This stage, henceforth
referred to as ‘notification’, ensures that both the regions and the developers possess
qualities that make the project viable- the government signals its approval of the
developer’s detailed business plan, and the developer signals keenness in the region
and his commitment to the plan by completing the purchase or rental of land. Form-
ing our analysis based on comparisons among regions that were actively targeted by
SEZ developers takes care of the first-order concern that the targeted regions may be
different, for example in terms of potential for growth, than other parts of India.
Our unit of analysis is a cell of roughly one square kilometer in area. We construct a
panel of all such cells within 20 kilometers of any notified SEZ in our sample, 95239
in total, and record their average luminosity from 2000 to 2013. Using luminosity
as a proxy for general economic activity, we then trace the pattern of SEZ influence
4through time and space. Firstly, we use an event study framework to analyze the
increase in economic activity that is spurred by the events of SEZ notification and
operation. This helps us establish that the beginning of operations inside an SEZ
sets off a sharp increase in economic activity not only within the SEZ, but also in
the 5-kilometer neighborhood around it. We also find the effect to be moderately
persistent across time.
Next, we develop an empirical framework to analyze the effect on cells of SEZs at
different distances from the cells, up to a maximum distance of 20 kilometers. For
analyzing the effect of SEZs on cells located x kilometers away, we compare within-
cell changes in luminosity that can be attributable to the change in status from
pre-notification to post-operation of an SEZ x kilometers away. This analysis of the
pattern of SEZ influence across space reveals that areas up to 5 kilometers experience
a positive increase in economic activity due to SEZ operation. It is worthy to note
that areas of 5 kilometer radii circumscribe regions larger than the administrative
division of a typical Indian village. We also find that areas farther away are not hurt
significantly (by a potential withdrawal of resources to areas closer to SEZs) thus
recording net positive effects up to areas spanning 1200 square kilometers, quarter
the size of a median district in our data-set.4 Our results are robust to the addition
of cell-level and year fixed effects, as well as to adjusting standard errors for spatial
autocorrelation.
Additionally, within the same framework, we study the importance of migration pat-
terns in the increase in recorded economic activity. Using gridded population data at
the same level of disaggregation as the satellite lights data, we analyze the patterns
of economic activity net of population growth to show that the positive spatial effects
4The district is the main level of local government below the state in India.
5are only partially explained by growth in population.
The key contribution of this work is that it shows that the SEZs did generate observ-
able and net positive effects on the wider economy despite the controversial nature of
the Indian SEZ policy. The Indian government heavily incentivized the participation
of the private sector in zonal development and allowed SEZs to be of substantially
smaller physical sizes than found elsewhere in the world. These features cast doubt
on the policy’s effectiveness and were debated in the Indian media among social,
political and academic authorities.5 Small zones were doubted capable of producing
significant additional economic activity. Private sector participation in SEZ develop-
ment was viewed as tax-free profit generation at the cost of issues such as misuse of
land and inequities favouring large companies over small ones. These valid concerns
notwithstanding, our analysis shows that the zones did bring benefits at an aggregate
level.6
We also contribute to the growing literature that uses satellite data to analyze the
impact of policies at the sub-national and even granular level. Nighttime lights data
fills an essential gap left by traditional data-sets, especially in developing economies
that do not support frequent or high quality coverage of sub-administrative regions.
Nighttime luminosity has been extensively utilized as a proxy for economic growth
and development (Henderson et al., 2012), degree of urbanization (Ma et al., 2012),
degree of electrification (Min et al., 2013), population density (Sutton et al., 1997) etc.
The frequency and disaggregated nature of the lights data allows for creative applica-
tions in studying a variety of interesting and previously unexplorable issues, such as
5See Aggarwal (2006) for a summary of the policy debate.
6Plausibly a result of the co-locating pattern of SEZs within narrow regions (which strengthened
agglomerative forces) and the private sector’s ability to target high potential regions and drive
greater efficiency in resource allocation.
6regional political favoritism as in Hodler and Raschky (2014), and the effects of spa-
tial distribution of ethnicities before colonization (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou,
2013).
In the Indian context, given that economic data is spatially coarse, available at in-
frequent intervals and may fail to capture the extent of economic activity in its vast
unorganized sector, the usage of a neutral measure of economic activity enriches the
overall examination and adds robustness to the findings derived from other data-sets
that are available at higher levels of spatial aggregation. Our reliance on nighttime
lights data to capture general economic activity at the sub-national level is further
bolstered by Bhandari and Roychowdhury (2011) who find that district-level GDP in
India can be significantly explained by lights data and by Dugoua et al. (2018) who
find that lights data has strong predictive power for village-level electrification in In-
dia. Furthermore, by being agnostic to the nature of economic activity captured by
nighttime lights, we handle the criticism that sub-national comparisons of economic
development using nighttime lights is problematic. Works such as Mellander et al.
(2015) argue that the correlation between the nighttime lights and economic activity
is weak for wages and strong for population and establishment density in the case
of Sweden. In our case, even if nighttime lights are only correlated with population
density, not economic growth, it still provides us with meaningful interpretation since
we are also interested in spatial reallocation of human resources.
Finally, we provide a general framework for evaluating place-based development poli-
cies using remote sensing data which can be easily adapted for analyzing other such
programs in India or other countries. Our framework is especially useful when poli-
cies are not implemented at an administrative level such as state, province or county.
7Such policies allow for analytical methods such as spatial discontinuity design along
administrative borders, as employed by Shenoy (2016) in his analysis of the New In-
dustrial policy in the Indian state of Uttarakhand. Our cell-level analysis of policy
impact provides a method for studying changes that are within these larger regions,
such as industrial corridors, technology parks and other important spatially narrow
infrastructure projects.
1.2 The Indian SEZ Experience
The Government of India’s SEZ policy was influenced by the success story of the
Chinese SEZs. Impressed by his observations of the SEZs in Guangdong province in
2000, the Commerce Minister of India initiated changes in India’s Export-Import pol-
icy which converted existing Export Processing Zones (EPZs), which were industrial
estates that produced export-oriented goods, to Special Economic Zones (SEZs).7
SEZs were envisioned as comprehensive industrial townships with social facilities like
housing blocks, schools and hospitals. The real growth in SEZ activity was kick-
started by the SEZ Act of 2005, which officially proclaimed its objectives to be: (a)
generation of additional economic activity, (b) promotion of exports of goods and
services, (c) promotion of investment from domestic and foreign sources, (d) creation
of employment opportunities and (e) development of infrastructure facilities.
The Indian SEZs differed in two key ways from SEZs and other place-based programs
in the world, including the Chinese model: the minimum size requirement was much
lower. This resulted in Indian SEZs being physically much smaller than municipality-
7EPZs do not form part of our sample.
8sized SEZs in China and census tracts designated as Empowerment Zones in the
United States. The size requirements were sector-specific; while Information Tech-
nology (IT) SEZs were allowed to be as small as 0.1 square kilometers, multi-product
SEZs needed to be at least 10 square kilometers of area. The second distinguishing
feature of Indian SEZs is that they were open to development by both the public
and private sectors resulting in 70% of the SEZs being either private or joint sector
initiatives.8 These features resulted in two main trends in zone location:9 both pub-
lic and private sector SEZs tended to locate in urbanized areas with already existing
industrial clusters, or they clustered in belts to promote the development of a new
industry within the state. Hence, despite the small size of an individual SEZ, the ten-
dency to cluster increased the potential of agglomeration spillovers to impact regional
productivity and economic growth. Studying this unique pattern of SEZ development
could thus provide useful lessons to countries that find it economically and politically
infeasible to develop large-sized SEZs.
Similar to other place-based development programs through the world, India provided
largely fiscal incentive packages to the SEZ developers as well as to the firms locating
within SEZs (henceforth referred to as units). Table A.1 in the Appendix provides an
overview of these incentives. The most notable of these is the 100% tax exemption
on profits for the first five years of operation which converted to a 50% exemption in
the next five after which the same rate was applied to any profit that was reinvested
into SEZ activity.10 Additionally, both developers and SEZ firms were exempted
from paying the Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT), currently 18.5% of book profits in
8Authors’ estimates.
9See Aggarwal (2011) for a detailed survey of SEZ developers on issues including zone location
and development.
10The corporate tax rate is 35% in India.
9India.11 The MAT is a compulsory tax levied on companies that make substantial
profits but have low, or even zero, tax liability due to the host of deductions and
exemptions available under the income tax law. According to a representative survey
of SEZ developers and companies by Mukherjee and Bhardwaj (2016), 84% of the
interviewed units declared that the tax exemptions formed the biggest motivating
factor for them to begin production within SEZs.
Apart from tax benefits, both developers and companies wishing to locate within
SEZs enjoyed an ease in administrative procedures through the “single window mech-
anism”. Applications were reviewed jointly by both the Central and State govern-
ments through a single regulatory body- the Board of Approval (BoA)- which was
set up to facilitate a fast pace of clearances and resolution of bureaucratic red-tape
typically surrounding the starting of a business venture. All of these incentives helped
to create a relatively hassle-free environment for firms which wished to operate in a
country not known for its ease of doing business.12
Our empirical analysis hinges on the approval process for establishing SEZs. Appli-
cations to develop SEZs were submitted to the BoA which met quarter-yearly and
reviewed them based on the following criteria: the quality of the business plan, the
plan for financing, land type targeted13 and prior approvals of the state government.14
While these factors were repeatedly highlighted during the decision making process,
the relative importance of each, and whether this list is exhaustive, is unclear. If the
11This exemption was reversed in 2011.
12In 2017, India ranked 130 out of the 190 countries considered in the World Bank’s Ease of
Doing Business Index, and has been consistently ranked below countries such as Iran, Nicaragua
and Uganda.
13The land should not only meet the minimum size requirements, but it should also be a contiguous
area which is preferably waste land or unsuitable for double-crop cultivation.
14Information derived from the published BoA meeting minutes.
10
application meets the requirements, the developing company is issued a formal ap-
proval. After this, it needs to revert to the BoA with documentation on land rental or
purchase agreements as well as with any revisions to the development plan suggested
by the BoA. At this stage, the body issues a notification for the SEZ. This is usually
brought to the attention of the general public through news articles as well as notice
boards erected at the site of the planned SEZ. Construction then commences and an
SEZ is considered operational once the first unit starts production within it. Figure
A.1 in the Appendix illustrates the approval process of the SEZs.
In our analysis, we only consider those SEZs that pass the penultimate stage i.e. noti-
fication. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry is the primary source of information
on Indian SEZs in the form of lists of notified and operational SEZs in India. We
merge the lists to obtain information on the developer, date of notification, whether
the zone has started operation, zone size, the industrial sector as well as the location
of each SEZ (down to the village level, and occasionally to the street level). We
then add the actual starting dates of operational SEZs, defined as the year in which
the first unit within the SEZ becomes operational, which we source from newspa-
per articles, BoA meeting minutes and developers’ websites. Our data-set, given the
rich location details, can easily be analyzed at multiple levels of aggregation- at the
neighborhood level with geo-coded location data, village and district level. This is
helpful in merging it with secondary data of different aggregation possibilities (as
we do in the next Chapters). Our sample includes all notified SEZs in the states
of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh and
Tamil Nadu which host more than 80% of total operational SEZs. At any point in
time, we compare regions that host, or are about to host, operating or notified SEZs.
11
1.3 Data Overview
Our main data-set for analyzing the pattern of spillovers from SEZs is the Nightime
Lights (henceforth referred to as NTL) time series. This is obtained from the National
Centers for Environmental Information. The resolution is 30 arc-seconds which covers
approximately 854 meters around the center of India, and the data values range from
0 (background noise) to 63. We clean the series from 2000 to 2013 by removing
ephemeral events and gas flares to obtain persistent and stable lighting. The NTL
has three main advantages- it is available annually at a high level of disaggregation
and provides a neutral measure of a region’s economic activity. Compared to most
countries’ releases of socioeconomic data, which are infrequently available at higher
levels of spatial aggregation, the NTL will be more helpful in confirming the effects
of an SEZ that appear precisely in the year it becomes notified or operational, over
narrow as well as wider neighbourhoods.
Using the NTL data and geo-coding the locations of all the SEZs in our data-set,
we overlay a fine grid layer over the map of India and use each cell as the unit of
analysis. Each cell is defined as a square with the length of 0.01 decimal degree,
which is approximately 1.025 kilometers at around the center of India. In order to
see the indirect or spillover effects of SEZs on the cells, we restrict our attention to
cells that are believed to be strictly outside of SEZs. For identifying cells outside
the zones, we assume that SEZs are circularly shaped since the exact shape of SEZs
are unknown. Using the area of the SEZ reported by its developer, we calculate the
radius of the SEZ and draw a circle around the point. The circular shape assumption
is a strong one and creates a concern that we might label area that is actually inside
the SEZ as non-SEZ area. To avoid defining inside-SEZ cells as outside-SEZ ones,
12
we take a conservative approach and increase the radii of SEZs by 10%.15 We then
record for each cell, the NTL reading over the years16 and the distances between the
centroid of the cell and the projected boundary of every SEZ in our database, thus
linking SEZ-level information (such as notification and operation years) with cell-level
information. We restrict our attention to cells that are at most 20 kilometers away
from their closest SEZ, and the resulting number of observations (cells) is 95239 per
year.
We additionally use the Gridded Population of the World (GPW) data series in order
to measure the extent to which the effects recorded by our analysis of the NTL data
is driven by population movements. This data-set, downloadable from the NASA
Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC), is available at 5-year intervals
from 2000. The lowest level of data resolution is the same as the NTL (roughly 1
kilometer-wide cells). The data for each cell is derived using the population listed
by national and sub-national administrative units. In the case of India, this is the
level of the sub-district. Each grid cell is assigned with values of population density
per square kilometer according to a proportional allocation gridding algorithm which
allocates the same value to all cells within a sub-district.17 We hence acknowledge
that the data-set may have limitations for study at a granular level. However, since
the cell-level population is at least not derived from its NTL reading, it is useful to
analyze cell-level NTL per population. This provides us with an estimate for how
important population movements are as an explanation for the effects produced by
15See Figure 1·1 which depicts the fine grid of cells superimposed on orange circles that indicate
SEZ locations as well as size.
16In cases there were two satellites collecting data for a cell, we take the average of the two
readings.
17The allocation is based on an assumption that the population of a grid cell is the exclusive
function of the land area within that pixel. Water area such as lakes, rivers, and ice-covered areas
are excluded.
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the NTL analysis.
Table 1.1 provides us with an overview of the SEZs in our sample. We have 251
notified SEZs in our sample, with 133 of them operational by 2014. The median
size of an SEZ is about a third of a square kilometer, the size of around 32 soccer
fields. The mean is much bigger at 1.5 square kilometers due to the presence of a few
exceptionally large SEZs such as that the Mundra SEZ in Gujarat which spans 64
square kilometers. Since the IT and electronic sector SEZs make up 69% of the total
and their minimum size requirements are small, this size distribution is to be expected.
It is also apparent from Panel A that SEZs are largely a private sector venture with
70% of the zones being developed by purely private or joint sector entities. The
average year of notification of an SEZ is 2008 (Panel A) with operating SEZs being
notified slightly earlier (Panel B). The difference between average year of notification
and operation for SEZs in Panel B shows us that the developers take an average of two
and half years to secure the necessary permits, complete substantial construction and
attract their first tenants. Panel A of Table 1.1 also displays the average NTL and
NTL per population in 3 kilometer-neighborhoods around SEZ boundaries. These
neighborhoods experienced an increase in economic activity, which goes beyond the
increase in population judging by the values of both variables after the initiation of
the SEZ Act.
It is important to note that due to the NTL data being top-coded at 63, our analysis
may be capturing the lower bound of the actual growth that took place. This is
because SEZs tend to locate in relatively urban areas with already high values of
NTL and may result in the right-censoring of our empirical results. We, therefore,
anticipate spillover effects to be underestimated in our study. Figure 1·2 indeed
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confirms that by the end of sample period, 2013, a non-negligible fraction of the data
is top-coded implying that our estimates are conservative.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
Our methodology relies on using the thirteen-year panel data-set of cells, the con-
struction of which was detailed in the earlier section. Our general approach is to
compare cells based on their proximity to SEZs and measure the differential effects
on them through time due to an SEZ’s presence.
For clarity of interpretation, we focus on the time and distance dimensions in separate
analyses. The time-dimension analysis uses an event-study framework and examines
how a given area reacts to the event of a nearby SEZ beginning operation. The cells
considered in the event-study are those that have exactly one SEZ within 3 kilometers
that begin operation between 2006, the first year of SEZ operations, and 2013, the
last year of observation of the NTL. In making this selection, we aim to (a) focus on
the reaction of the immediate neighborhood and (b) reduce the number of SEZs that
affect a cell.18
For such a cell i that is situated outside of SEZs in year t, we run the following
specification:
log(lightit) = αi + βt +
k 6=−1∑
−13≤k≤7
γk ∗Dikt + it, (1.1)
18Since the treatment is at the SEZ level and the analysis at the cell level, it is possible that a cell
is influenced by multiple SEZs in its vicinity, with overlapping notification and operation timelines,
especially given the tendency of SEZs to cluster.
15
where the outcome variable is logged luminosity of cell i at time t, which is the logged
transformation of the cell’s NTL value incremented by 1. A binary variable Dikt takes
the value of one if the SEZ within 3 kilometers away from cell i has been operating
for k years in year t. Year 0 is the initial year of operation of an SEZ. We use cell
and year fixed effects to add robustness to our findings. Additionally, we correct the
standard errors for spatial autocorrelation following the specification of Conley (1999)
up to a cutoff of 30 kilometers.
The estimates of interest are γk’s, for k ∈ [−13, 6]. Each γk can be interpreted as
the change in brightness (in log deviations) of a cell, k years since the operation of
the nearby SEZ, relative to the year before its operation (γ−1 is normalized to 0).
We expect γk to be positive and its magnitude to be increasing in k after the initial
year of operation, indicating persistence in the effect of operating SEZs. Prior to
operation, we should not expect any significant trend in γk since we do not expect
regions to be affected by an SEZ even before it establishes its presence. We also
use the same framework and have similar expectations from the coefficients when we
study the event of notification of an SEZ.
For the distance-dimension analysis, we classify the SEZs at any point in time into
three main age groups: period0 denotes years before the SEZ is notified, period1
covers the post-notification and pre-operation years , and period2, the years after
operation. For a cell i that is not located in any SEZ, an SEZ in the x-th distance
ring (x− 1 to x kilometers away from the cell) exerts an effect which is dependant on
whether the SEZ is in period 0, 1 or 2 of its lifetime. In order to study the varying
effect of an SEZ across distances, we conduct the following analysis for a particular
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value of x:
log(lightit) = αi+βt+γx∗period1ixt+δx∗period2ixt+
15∑
d=x+1
2∑
θ=0
λθdperiodθidt+it, (1.2)
The main outcome variable is logged luminosity of cell i in year t and we run the
above specification for each integer value of x from 0 to 15. For the xth distance ring
analysis, we consider all cells that have their closest SEZ in this ring. periodθixt is
the number of periodθ SEZs that are in the xth ring away from cell i in year t, for
θ values 0, 1 and 2.19 The average difference in the effects of period 2 and period
0 SEZs (which is the base group), denoted by δx, captures the additional effect felt
on a cell due to the operation of an SEZ in the xth ring. The average change to the
NTL of a cell due to the notification of an SEZ in the xth ring is similarly denoted by
γx. δx can be thought of as a long-run effect of an SEZ on a cell, and γx, the short-
run effect. Both measures are useful in developing an understanding of the changes
that the local economy experiences, although the latter effect is of greater economic
interest. The double summation term indicates that we control for all farther away
SEZs affecting the cell (but not within the xth gm gmring), in whatever period of
life they may be.20 Just as in specification 1.1, the standard errors are corrected for
spatial autocorrelation.
We expect δx to be decreasing in x i.e. cells closer to SEZs experience the most positive
effects while cells farther away experience less positive or even negative effects. This
would be the case if there was a movement of resources away from farther areas to
areas closer to SEZs. This is a reasonable expectation given that the zones bring in
19The empirical results are qualitatively unchanged when the terms become dummy variables of
whether or not there is at least one SEZ in each period.
20Figure A.2 contains a pictorial representation of specification 1.2 for greater clarity.
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new firms that attract workers as well as other firms to the region due to an increase
in opportunities for work. We also expect that the effects of operating SEZs are
greater in magnitude than the effects of notified SEZs at all distances from the SEZs
(δx ≥ γx).
Using the specification above, we are also able to test if changes to the neighborhoods
of SEZs in terms of NTL is driven by population movements, a channel we can test at
the granular level with the main outcome variable being logged lights per population.
Since the population data is available at 5 year intervals, the period of life of an SEZ is
updated every 5 years. We expect that a significant portion of the expected increase
in NTL at neighborhoods close to SEZs will be driven by an increase in population
in that neighborhood. The magnitudes should, however, be taken as less reliable
than in the analysis using only NTL data due to the way in which population data
is constructed for India, as discussed in section 1.3.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Inside SEZs: Event Study of Activity within SEZs
An event-study of areas inside SEZs confirms the relevance of specification 1.1. Figure
1·3a reports the percent change in the cells’ NTL (derived from the γk’s) which
shows a clear and persistent increase in activity after the beginning of SEZ operation.
The figure, however, also indicates an upward trend in economic growth prior to
the SEZs’ operation. One possible explanation for this trend is the preparatory
activity undertaken in and around SEZs after notification (in terms of building, road
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construction, setting up water distribution networks etc.). As discussed in Section
1.3, this activity takes on average 2 to 3 years before the SEZ can begin operation.
Figure 1·3b, which studies the event of notification, confirms that the pre-operation
growth in Figure 1·3a may be driven by post-notification activities.
1.5.2 SEZ Spillovers: Event Study of SEZ Neighborhoods
We then restrict our attention to areas strictly outside, but within 3 kilometers from
any SEZ to study the spillover effect of SEZs across time. Figure 1·3c displays a sim-
ilar trend as the within-SEZ analysis. When an SEZ starts operating, the immediate
neighborhood experiences a significant increase in NTL which is, as to be expected,
lower than the increase within SEZs. It is persistent in magnitude but loses signifi-
cance over time. This could be due to the small number of SEZs older than 3 or 4
years old by 2013, considering the mean year of initial operation is 2009 according to
Table 1.1.
We still observe the upward trend in NTL prior to operation. Since the area of analysis
is physically outside zones, the increase in post-notification activity can be a result of
both construction activities that may extend outside zones such as building external
connecting roads as well as the surrounding economy preparing for the impending
shock to local demand for goods and services. A good example of the latter would
be the construction of hostels and residential properties to host potential out-of-area
SEZ workers. This may still not explain the upward-sloping trend prior to even the
notification of SEZs as Figure1·3d shows.21 However, we can still argue that regions
around notified SEZs experience a noticeable increase in the slope of NTL i.e. growth
21The pattern is preserved when we control for time trends in addition to year fixed effects.
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rates, upon notification.
Figures 1·4a and 1·4b display results from an alternate specification in which we mod-
ify the event to be the year of the earliest operating/notified SEZ within 3 kilometers.
This specification is more flexible in the selection of cells than the current one and
allows for the presence of multiple SEZs within the 3 kilometer radius. For example,
these cells could be representative of more urban areas which attract a greater num-
ber of SEZs. This does not, however, produce significantly different patterns which
adds to the robustness of our finding.22
1.5.3 SEZ Spillovers across Space
Figures 1·5a and 1·5b follow specification 1.2 to illustrate the spatial extent of SEZ
spillovers in the long- and short-run respectively. The resulting trends are in line with
our expectations. In the long- and short-run scenarios, we observe a sharp increase
in NTL in neighborhoods of operational SEZs (relative to the average level in the
pre-notification period), with the positive impact continuing to be significant up to 5
kilometers and diminishing with distance.
Interestingly, from Figure 1·5a, we do not find evidence of a zero-sum relocation of
resources due to the SEZ policy, at least at the level of aggregation considered in
this paper- at areas up to 15 kilometers away from SEZs. While areas at a distance
greater than 5 kilometers from SEZs seem to return to their normal growth pattern,
there is no strong evidence of farther regions being negatively affected by a with-
22We also experiment with increasing the radius of the neighborhood to 5 kilometers to get similar
results which are not included in the data appendix and are available on request.
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drawal of resources. This holds true when we check patterns over a wider area of
20 kilometers’ radius (results of which are presented in Figure A.3) that spans 1200
square kilometers. This area is equivalent to quarter the size of a median district in
our data-set. We cannot, however, rule out zero-sum effects over wider regions with
this framework.
One concern about specification 1.2 is that it considers cells that have their closest
SEZ in the xth distance ring and thus looks at different sets of cells for the analysis
across distances i.e. cells that do have SEZs in the xth distance ring are not considered
for the xth distance ring analysis if they have at least one SEZ that is nearer than x
kilometers.
We carry out an alternate, less restrictive specification by considering all cells that
have at least 1 SEZ in the xth distance ring, and controlling for both nearer and
farther away SEZs when studying the effects of SEZs at a particular distance ring x
around a cell. Results from this alternate specification is displayed in Figures 1·6a and
1·6b. While the pattern of influence is similar to the ones produced with the original
specification, there is stronger evidence that regions farther away than 5 kilometers do
not get hurt and in fact experience positive and significant effects due to operational
SEZs.
In Figures 1·5c and 1·5d, we show that population movements do seem to drive some,
but not all, of the increase in NTL especially in the long-run scenario.23 This suggests
that there are other channels at play, especially in the case of effects produced by
operating SEZs.
23NTL per population is the outcome variable in this case and we use specification 1.2.
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1.6 Concluding Remarks
We thus confirm that Indian SEZs produce persistent and positive spillovers on the
local economy as measured by nighttime lights. While they boost economic activity
in areas up to 5 kilometers from zones (comparable to the size of a typical Indian
village), farther away areas do not seem to be significantly hurt. Thus SEZs can be
viewed as generators of net positive effects on areas several times the actual size of
the zones and even comparable to the size of an Indian district. We additionally find
that population movements only partially explain the recorded increase in economic
activity in SEZ neighborhoods.
The findings in this chapter not only motivate a deeper look into the forces behind the
spillovers generated in the local economy but also, importantly, lend credibility to the
results derived in the following chapters which use more traditionally available data-
sets on firms and workers in the Indian economy that are available at the spatially
aggregated level of the village or district.
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Figure 1·1: Construction of the Cell-level Panel
Note: The figure shows how the cell-level panel is constructed. A grid (denoted by the
blue lines) of 1 square-kilometer cells is overlaid on the map of India and cells that are
strictly outside geo-coded SEZ locations (depicted by the orange circles) are considered
for the analysis of spillover effects.
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Figure 1·2: Distribution of Nighttime Lights
Note: Figure shows the change in distribution of NTL for the cells in the sample from
2000 to 2013. NTL data is coded between 0 (background noise) and 63. Source: National
Centers for Environment Information
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Figure 1·3: Event Study of SEZs and SEZ Neighborhoods
(a) Event: Operation, Inside SEZs (b) Event: Notification, Inside SEZs
(c) Event: Operation, SEZ Neighborhood (d) Event: Notification, SEZ Neighborhood
Note: Figures plot .01*percentage change in NTL backed out from γ′ks in specification
1.1. The year before the event (operation/notification), year -1, is the base year. Cell and
year fixed effects are included. 95% confidence intervals are generated based on spatial
HAC errors with 30 kilometer cutoff.
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Figure 1·4: Alternate Specification: Event Study of 3-km Neighborhoods
(a) Event: Operation, SEZ neighborhood (b) Event: Notification, SEZ neighborhood
Note: Figures plot .01*percentage change in NTL backed out from γ′ks in specification
1.1. The year before the event (operation/notification), year -1, is the base year. Cell and
year fixed effects are included. 95% confidence intervals are generated based on spatial
HAC errors with 30 kilometer cutoff.
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Figure 1·5: Effect of SEZs across Distances
(a) Long Run Effect: NTL (b) Short Run Effect: NTL
(c) Long Run Effect: NTL per population (d) Short Run Effect: NTL per population
Note: Figures plot .01*percentage change in NTL and NTL/population backed out from
δ′xs in specification 1.2 due to the presence of an additional notified/operating SEZ in the
distance ring x. The base period is the pre-notification period of an SEZ in distance ring
x. Cell and year fixed effects included. 95% confidence intervals are generated based on
spatial HAC errors with 30 kilometer cutoff.
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Figure 1·6: Alternate specification for Distance Dimension Analysis
(a) Long-run effect: NTL (b) Short-run effect: NTL
Note: Figures plot .01*percentage change in NTL backed out from δ′xs in the altered
version of specification 1.2 where all cells with at least one SEZ in distance ring x are
considered in the distance ring x analysis (instead of only those cells with their closest SEZ
in distance ring x). The base period is the pre-notification period of an SEZ in distance
ring x. Cell and year fixed effects included. 95% confidence intervals are generated based
on spatial HAC errors with 30 kilometer cutoff.
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Table 1.1: Summary of SEZ & NTL Data
Mean Median Std. Dev.
Panel A: All SEZs
Year of notification 2008.1 2008.0 1.892
Area (sq. km) 1.47 0.27 4.83
Public 0.29 0.00 0.21
Manufacturing 0.24 0.00 0.43
IT/electronics/engineering 0.69 1.00 0.47
Neighborhood NTL (2000) 20.0 11.6 18.6
Neighborhood NTL (2005) 19.8 11.1 19.2
Neighborhood NTL per population (2005) 0.030 0.017 0.048
Neighborhood NTL per population (2010) 0.054 0.034 0.064
Number of observations 251
Panel B: Operational SEZs
Year of notification 2007.3 2007.0 1.303
Year of operation 2009.7 2010.0 2.226
Number of observations 133
· An SEZ is considered public if any district or state agency was involved in the devel-
opment process.
· Neighborhood of an SEZ is defined as the area within 3km away from the boundary of
the SEZ.
· Source: Ministry of Commerce & Industry, National Centers for Environment Infor-
mation, NASA
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Chapter 2
The Effect of Indian SEZs: The Impact on
Firms and Workers in the Local Economy
2.1 Introduction
Place-based development programs such as Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are an
increasingly popular policy tool to induce economic development in a region. India
introduced the 2005 Special Economic Zones (SEZ) Act as one of the biggest pushes
to industrial development in its history. For over ten years from 2005, the country
invested 0.5 per cent of its annual GDP into this program, amounting to 62 billion
US dollars- substantial by both Indian and international standards.1221 SEZs began
operation across the nation, attracting firms through tax exemptions, infrastructural
benefits and regulatory concessions, directly employing 1.4 million people and con-
tributing to almost one-third of the annual national exports.2 However, the observed
economic activity of SEZs alone is not evidence of the policy’s success. The chief
1According to Shenoy (2016), roughly half the amount was spent over a decade by the Indian
government for financing infrastructural development and providing tax exemptions to all firms
in two eastern Indian states. Kline and Moretti (2013) and Busso et al. (2013) also estimate the
investments in the Tennessee Valley Authority program and the Empowerment Zones to be lower-
around 20 billion and 3 billion dollars respectively.
2Statistics sourced from the Ministry of Commerce website and Mukherjee and Bhardwaj (2016).
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concern is that these observed benefits to regions receiving SEZs could be offset by
losses elsewhere in the economy through resource relocations. This would produce
little, if any, aggregate gains at considerable costs.
The literature on such place-based development policies measures their cost-effectiveness
based on the programs’ ability to form linkages with the local economy.3 Stronger
linkages between highly productive and export-oriented firms concentrated within
zones, and the non-zonal economy, can increase local competition, produce denser
input and labor markets and knowledge spillovers among firms and workers. These
can drive long-run development and net positive effects even at an aggregate regional
level. Given the magnitude of investment into the Indian SEZ policy, it is impor-
tant to understand if it had a similar influence on the surrounding economy and to
evaluate the extent of its benefits.
We provide one of the first empirical evaluations of the influence of Indian SEZs on
the non-SEZ economy. In doing so, we add to the limited understanding of the effects
of place-based development policies in the context of developing countries. Using the
stages of approvals for SEZs as a source of quasi-experimental variation, Chapter 1
reveals an increase in general economic activity in SEZ neighborhoods and confirms
that there are net positive benefits to regions several times the size of the zones- up
to the sub-national level of a district.
In this Chapter, we make novel contributions to understanding how the SEZ policy
interacts with both the informal and formal sectors of the economy, a dual economy
framework which is unique to low income countries. Informality refers to several
firm- and worker-level characteristics, the most pertinent ones in the Indian context
3SeeFarole et al. (2011) and Aggarwal (2011) for a discussion.
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being the absence of any form of regulation in production, omission from the tax
base, and workers that are often unskilled and that do not receive social security
benefits. While the Indian informal sector is characterized by low productivity, it is
a major source of employment hiring about 80% of the total labor force.4 Greater
formality is considered more desirable because it brings a larger part of the economy
under beneficial government regulation (in matters such as worker safety and welfare)
and broadens the tax base. Moreover, a shift of resources from the less productive
informal sector would increase the overall productivity of the economy.5
Our analysis reveals that SEZs instigate a structural transformation of the economy,
increasing firm size (in terms of production, employment and investment) and pro-
ductivity in the formal sector while crowding out production and causing a shift of
resources out of the informal sector. While this show-cases the potential of such poli-
cies to bring about long-term development, we also find evidence suggestive of a rise
in wage inequality in the short-term.
The scale of effects we record for the Indian SEZ policy is striking given its depar-
ture from the traditional mould of SEZs across the world. The Indian government
incentivized the participation of the private sector in zonal development and allowed
SEZs to be of substantially smaller physical sizes than found elsewhere in the world.
These features cast doubt on the policy’s effectiveness and were debated in the Indian
media among social, political and academic authorities.6 Small zones were doubted
to be capable of producing significant additional economic activity. Private sector
4Authors’ calculations from the 2005 National Sample Survey (NSS) round on Employment and
Unemployment.
5Hsieh and Klenow (2009) estimate a 40% increase in overall productivity from reallocating
resources to larger (formal) firms.
6See Aggarwal (2006) for a summary of the policy debate.
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participation in SEZ development was viewed as tax-free profit generation at the cost
of issues such as misuse of land and inequities favouring large companies over small
ones. These valid concerns notwithstanding, our analysis shows that the zones did
bring benefits at an aggregate level.7
The challenge to our identification strategy comes from the non-random nature of
program location. This is a common concern for studies analyzing place-based de-
velopment policies.8 In order to credibly isolate the effect of SEZs on the regional
economy, we exploit a source of variation in the government-regulated approval pro-
cess for SEZs. We consider only those regions surrounding SEZs that have reached
the penultimate stage of approval before beginning operation. This stage, henceforth
referred to as ‘notification’, ensures that both the regions and the developers possess
qualities that make the project viable- the government signals its approval of the
developer’s detailed business plan, and the developer signals keenness in the region
and his commitment to the plan by completing the purchase or rental of land. Form-
ing our analysis based on comparisons among regions that were actively targeted by
SEZ developers takes care of the first-order concern that the targeted regions may be
different, for example in terms of potential for growth, than other parts of India.
Our main results on the aggregate effects of SEZ spillovers are derived from a difference-
in-differences framework using a rich set of variables on firms and workers drawn from
formal and informal sector surveys. We compare outcomes between regions that have
at least one operating SEZ (treated regions) and those with at least one SEZ that pass
7Plausibly a result of the co-locating pattern of SEZs within narrow regions (which strengthened
agglomerative forces) and the private sector’s ability to target high potential regions and thus greater
efficiency in resource allocation.
8Due to private sector participation in program location, we face the opposite concern of studies
generally involving zones in developed economies which usually target under-industrialized regions.
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notification (control regions). In choosing control regions in this fashion, we are also
similar to Busso et al. (2013) in not comparing areas to their geographical neighbours,
limiting the concern of spillovers to the treated regions from control regions (such as
movement of workers) that may mechanically bias our treatment effect. Additionally,
we are able to separate the direct effects of SEZs (on firms and workers within SEZs)
from the indirect effect on the local non-SEZ economy by studying subsets of firms
and workers with varying possibilities of being located within SEZs. For robustness,
we conduct a series of pre-trends analyses for the regions in our study to address the
concern that there may be serious differences among areas chosen as treatment and
control.
We find that average labor productivity of formal sector manufacturing firms in
treated disticts increases differentially by 24% between 2005 and 2010. We also find
evidence for within-industry expansion in formal production by 46%, employment
by 18% and investment in plant and machinery by 37% over the same time period.
Along with productivity gains and an increase in the demand for labor, the wages in
the treated formal sector experienced a differential increase of 14% over wages in the
control district.
Our findings also suggest that the resultant agglomeration spillovers from SEZs struc-
turally transform the economy away from informal lines of production towards greater
formality. This is especially true in the case of informal manufacturing where we ob-
serve a halving of total production within industries of treated districts with total
employment declining by 24% and labor productivity by 42%. One possible explana-
tion for this trend is a selection effect driven by an increase in registrations among the
most productive firms in the informal sector or those that previously stayed under
34
the radar to escape taxes and other regulations. SEZ presence likely increased the
demand for higher quantity and quality of local goods and services, thus motivating
informal sector firms to register themselves to signal quality and expand customer
base. The next chapter evaluates if increasing registrations and the quality channel
are strong explanatory channels. We also find evidence of a significant decrease in
employment in firms at the lower end of the productivity spectrum, such as small
household businesses. This suggests a reduction in “forced informality which is usu-
ally a result of insufficient formal employment opportunities.
Although the impact of the SEZ policy has been positive in terms of stimulating
formalization in the economy, we find evidence of increasing inequality. The effect
on overall worker wages is non-uniform. While workers at the 90th percentile of the
income distribution gain as much as 38% over the years in which their district was
treated with SEZs, those at the lower end of the wage (and education) distribution
seem not to gain significantly. This suggests that workers are left out of the wage
benefits due to their inability of being absorbed by the formal sector and corroborates
the current concern in both developed and developing countries about a skill gap
where the workforce is unable to fulfill the demand for skilled labor thus holding back
further prospects of development.
Due to the unique nature of Indian SEZs and our focus on how they affect the little-
explored dual economic structure of the Indian economy, we provide new insights to
the literature on place-based development policies. Our finding of increased formal-
ization is similar to Magruder (2013) who finds that the change in minimum wage rule
in Indonesia acted as a big-push mechanism leading to greater formalization. Works
studying SEZs and similar programs in India and China, such as Wang (2013), Alder
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et al. (2016), Chaurey (2016) and Shenoy (2016), do not touch upon the effect of such
programs on the formal-informal sector dynamics.
Our analysis of the formal sector is more comparable to the work of others in studying
the impact of place-based programs in developed countries that do not have prominent
informal sectors. Here we contribute on a more positive note to the mixed evidence
on the role of firm agglomeration in boosting productivity and development of a
region. Greenstone et al. (2010) find positive productivity gains to firms located
in the same county as million dollar plants in the United States while Kline and
Moretti (2013) find that agglomeration gains from the Tennessee Valley Authority
program are offset by losses elsewhere in the country. The evidence is also mixed
in the case of programs in developing countries when only the impact on the formal
economy is considered. Wang (2013) finds that municipalities receiving early waves
of Chinese SEZs experience productivity gains while Chaurey (2016) does not find
state-level productivity gains from firm agglomeration in the Indian state of Himachal
Pradesh as a result of the New Industrial Policy. The movement of resources to
treated regions from other regions is potentially responsible for muted gains at a
spatially aggregated level. Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008) point out that this shift
may still have an overall welfare impact on the aggregate economy if the elasticity of
productivity to agglomeration is greater in places receiving the programs. Empirically,
non-linearity of agglomeration effects is a challenge to establish and many papers,
including this one, focus on attempting to document if there are positive net effects
on the surrounding economy, up to a sub-national level of aggregation.
Our findings of an increase in employment and wages in the formal sector of treated
regions, both real and nominal, are in line with those of Kline and Moretti (2013),
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Busso et al. (2013), Wang (2013) and Chaurey (2016). Given the traditionally low
level of labor mobility in India,9 real wage increases are also consistent with the
prediction of Moretti (2010) that low labor mobility implies that any benefits from a
shock to labor demand accrues to workers residing within a region.10
While we provide a comprehensive overview of the benefits from the Indian SEZ
policy, explicit cost-benefit calculations are beyond the scope of this current work.
2.2 Data Overview
In order to understand the general equilibrium effects of SEZ activity, we examine
individual and firm behavior in response to the introduction of SEZs. We employ
multiple data sets at different levels of administrative units- the village, sub-district
and district. At the village level, we analyze firm and worker numbers using the Eco-
nomic Census (EC). The strength of the EC data is that it is a complete enumeration
of all enterprises in India (except those engaged in crop plantation and cultivation).
Through firm-level information on employee size, industry and ownership type, it
provides us with an overview of the distribution of activity across industrial sectors,
both manufacturing and services, in every village or town. The EC data covers infor-
mation on 28 million firms located in the districts of our interest in each of the two
rounds available, 2005 and 2012.11.
9Topalova (2010) finds that there is surprisingly little impact on the already low inter-district
migratory patterns due to the landmark trade reform of 1991 that officially opened India to inter-
national trade.
10High mobility, on the other hand, would predict an in-migration of workers who would apply an
upward pressure on land prices and cancel out the effect of any increase in nominal wages.
11Results pertaining to village-level analysis can be found in Appendix B
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At the district level, we make use of more detailed firm characteristics such as pro-
duction and wages to shed light on the mechanism behind SEZ effects. For studying
movements within the formal manufacturing sector,12 we use the Annual Survey of
Industries (ASI) dataset. The ASI dataset is an annual survey of firms in manufac-
turing that are considered formal i.e. those registered under the Factories Act.13 It
comprises of a complete enumeration of firms above a 100 in worker strength with
an annual survey of a repeated random cross-section of smaller firms. This data con-
tains more information than the EC which allows for a deeper analysis of firm-level
variables such as size (employment, asset base and production), new firm formation
and costs of production including wages and rents. The data set covers around 30000
firms in the districts of our interest annually from 2000 to 2009. We also make use of a
similarly rich set of firm-level information provided by the informal sector counterpart
to the ASI, the NSS Unorganized Manufacturing and Services quinquennial survey
data that covers firms in the unregistered sector of the Indian economy. Each survey
round in our study (2000,2005 and 2010) contains information on around 35000 firms
in the districts of our interest.
We complement the firm analysis with worker-level information which allows us to
analyze worker wage effects within districts taking into consideration individual char-
acteristics such as education level attained and household demographics. This in-
formation is derived from the NSS Employment and Unemployment Surveys. The
data set is a repeated cross-section of a nationally representative sample of workers
from across all industrial activities. Information on firm type and industry, wages,
12Nationally representative surveys on formal service firms have not been conducted so far in
India.
13Registration under the Factories Act is required for firms above 10 workers if the unit uses
power, and above 20, if not. This is also the standard definition of formality adopted by researchers
on the Indian economy.
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household characteristics, education and consumption is provided. The data set cov-
ers around 104000 workers in every round considered (2000,2005 and 2010) among
the districts in our study. While the worker-level survey data does not have explicit
indicators for whether the worker is employed in the formal or the informal sector, we
make the distinction using the 10- worker rule of the Factory Act in order to analyze
the effects of SEZs separately on the informal and the formal work-force.
Table B.2 in Appendix B gives an overview of the regions and population studied
in 2005. The regions in our study were on average much denser than the all-India
average of 382 people per square kilometer. More than 90% of the working population
in a district received no education above secondary level. Average firm size was small
with 96% of them employing below 10 workers. This indicates the highly skewed firm
size distribution and the vast size of the informal sector.14 The extent of informality
in the economy is also apparent from indicators such as the proportions of firms that
hire no workers at all (40%), operate without power (34%), do not have external
financing options (96%) and rely on informal sources of finance (around 40%). We
also find evidence of the low level of productivity in the informal sector, with wages
in the formal sector manufacturing being on average almost 10 times that of those in
the informal sector.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
The annual data on the formal manufacturing sector allows us to use a general-
ized difference-in-differences framework to study the year-on-year effects of additional
14The figure is comparable to estimates in Amirapu and Gechter (2014).
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SEZs as they become notified or operational within a district. The treatment vari-
ables are now the stock of operating SEZs in district d at time t and the stock of
notified but not yet operating SEZs in the same district at time t:
yfidt = α0 +α1 ∗No.OperatingSEZsdt+α2 ∗No.NotifiedSEZsdt+αi+αd+βt+εidt
(2.1)
yfidt is the outcome variable of an average formal manufacturing firm f in industry
i and district d at time t. These include logged values of production, average labour
productivity (defined as total production per worker), wages, employment and value of
plant and machinery. No.OperatingSEZsdt refers to the total number of operational
SEZs in district d at time t and No.NotifiedSEZsdt refers to the number of notified
but not yet operational SEZs in district d at time t. District, industry and year fixed
effects are included with the standard errors being clustered at the district level. In
the above specifications, we are assuming that every SEZ, operational and notified,
has a uniformly additive effect on the outcomes of a firm in a district-industry cell.
We expect positive effects on firm-level measures such as average labor productivity,
employment and production due to the presence of an additional operating SEZ.
This would provide proof of the push that SEZs give to local demand and of the
productivity spillovers that they are capable of generating. The specification also
allows us to evaluate the changes that are brought about by notified SEZs in the region
which could reveal the mechanism behind the increase in light activity following SEZ
notification in the previous chapter.
In order to analyze the formal sector data along with the less frequently available
informal sector data, we adopt a simple difference-in-differences framework which
chiefly requires that the regions we consider, both treated and control, follow com-
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mon trends prior to the intitiation of the SEZ policy. This is a challenge since such
place-based policies are not randomly located. In the case of developed economies,
zones are usually located in under-industrialized regions. In the Indian context, SEZ
development, mainly a private sector initiative, targeted regions with a greater degree
of urbanization, human capital quality and profitability. In our case, a simple com-
parison of areas with SEZs and those without would be unsatisfactory since it will
likely violate the common pre-trends assumption and bias our difference-in-differences
estimate of effects upwards.
Our solution is to adapt a similar strategy to the one commonly used in the literature
on place-based development policies- we use the the approval process of SEZs as a
source of quasi-experimental variation. We compare regions in which there is at least
one SEZ that has passed notification (the control group) with those that have at
least one operating in them (the treated group). The exact set of regions that fall
into treatment and control categories differ according to the frequency and level of
aggregation allowed by the multiple data-sets used.15 In the case of Busso et al.
(2013) and Kline and Moretti (2013), control regions were formed out of rejected
areas whereas, in our case, the control areas were never disqualified by administrative
authorities and were expected to have operating SEZs in the near future. On the
other hand, Busso et al. (2013) further strengthened their strategy using the set of
selection criteria for Empowerment Zones and matching treated and control zones
through propensity score weighting. In this, they had the advantage of a longer
time series on all the socioeconomic indicators that were known to influence zone
selection. In our case, the exact set of conditions used by the BoA to deem an SEZ
notification-worthy, is unknown. What we know from the meeting minutes is that
these included other criteria than economic indicators for the region- such as the
15Refer to Appendix table B.1 for an overview.
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ability of the developer to posesss the land and propose a viable development plan.
The immediately obvious point in favour of our identification strategy is that it takes
care of the first-order concern that areas attracting SEZs, both notified and oper-
ational, may be fundamentally different from other areas in terms of worker and
industrial composition and potential for growth. Table 2.2 provides some evidence
for this when we compare across treated, control and other districts in the states in
our sample. Both treated and control districts are almost ten times as dense as other
districts in the states, consistent with the trend of SEZs locating in relatively urban
areas. Treated and control districts also seem to have substantially different worker
compositions than the rest of the state, especially with respect to the proportion of
workers employed in agriculture and manufacturing. The rest of the state seems to
predominantly depend on agriculture for its livelihood with 64% in related professions
compared to only 7% in treated or control districts. The average monthly income of
workers and their education level in the latter districts are also clearly higher and the
proportion employed in informal household businesses around 10 percentage points
lower. From this table, we get the impression that results from our proposed compar-
ison of treatment and control districts will be more credible than a simple comparison
of SEZ and non-SEZ districts.
One may be concerned that treated regions seem to be disproportionately among those
with earlier notified SEZs, as shown in Table 2.2. This could imply that the order of
notification is correlated with unobservables relevant for the outcomes studied. This
concern about timing is mitigated by two supporting factors. Firstly, we find that 60
percent of the control districts were targeted earlier by SEZ developers that did not
manage to reach the stage of notification. We derive this information from the BoA
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meeting minutes which discuss the decisions made on all the SEZs that ever applied
for approvals. These areas attracted initial interest around the same time as treated
areas according to the bottom rows of Table 2.2. We see that SEZs in both control
and treated districts received early formal approvals within the first year of the SEZ
Act. The average difference between the two groups receiving a formal approval was
only about 8 months.
Secondly, the locations were not chosen solely based on profitability but also giv-
ing weight to the own-state bias of SEZ developers, both public and private. State
governments always started SEZs within their states, and private sector developers
usually choose locations within the state or district in which they are headquartered.16
It is then quite likely that the control areas did not form part of the choice set of
developers in treated regions. This could be more due to their out-of-state location
rather than potential. There is a possibility, however, that treated regions differ in the
number of ‘capable’ developers than control regions given that they have earlier op-
erating SEZs; we address this problem with the addition of region fixed effects to our
framework which would take into account non-time varying differences in potential
among regions.
We derive additional evidence of common trends among treated and control regions by
utilizing NTL data to compare time trends among cells in 5 kilometer-neighborhoods
of SEZs that eventually became operational versus those that never became opera-
tional (by 2013, the last observation year for NTL). Figures 2·1a and 2·1b show that
both kinds of regions did not experience significantly different pre-trends (as captured
by trends in NTL) before notification, regardless of whether the SEZs in them ever
began operation. Since the areas covered by a 5 kilometer radius is roughly twice
16 From interviews with SEZ developers in Tamil Nadu.
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the size of an average village in our sample, the analysis confirms common trends
among relative large portions of land. We also find evidence for ‘developer serious-
ness’ in control regions from the trend in Figure 2·1b where areas around notified
SEZs seemed to experience an increase in economic activity in the initial couple of
years after notification judging from the spike in economic activity before the region
returned to its normal growth path. This supports our belief that the developers of
notified SEZs were committed to the region and to the project.
Additionally we take advantage of the ASI data to analyze pre-trends in district totals
of production, assets used and employment in formal manufacturing industries prior
to the SEZ Act. Figure 2·2 shows that there are no discernible differences in trends
among treated and control districts, except for a slightly higher trend in employment
in treated districts. We also carry out the following falsification test using the same
information at the firm-level, to see if operating and notified SEZs produced effects
on formal firm activity even before their introduction in districts:
log(yfidt) = α0 + αi + βt + γ ∗No.EventuallyOperatingSEZsd
+ δ ∗No.EventuallyNotifiedSEZsd + εfidt (2.2)
The outcome variable yfidt takes the logged values of variables related to an average
firm f in 2-digit industry i in district d at time t: such as production, investment,
employment, wages and average productivity. The main regressors are the number of
eventually operating and notified SEZs that the district receives after 2005. Since the
analysis is over the time period between 2000 and 2005 (before the announcement of
the SEZ Act.), the corresponding coefficients,γ and δ ,should not show any significance
and we find this to be true. The results can be found in Table 2.1 .
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Given the supporting evidence for our identification strategy drawn from varied
sources of information, we proceed to adopt it and use the following difference-in-
differences framework:
yirt = α0 + α1Tr + α2Tr1AFTER + αi + αr + βt + εirt (2.3)
yirt is the average firm-or worker-level outcome variable (such as logged worker wages
or firm size) in industry i in region r in year t. Tr is the treatment indicator which
is 1 for regions that were treated with at least one operational SEZ before the post-
treatment period as stated in Appendix table B.1. The value is 0 for regions that
have at least one SEZ notified before this time but none operational yet. 1AFTER
is the time indicator which takes the value 1 for the post-treatment period, and 0
otherwise. Region, industry (and in an alternate specifications, region-industry fixed
effects) and year fixed effects are included with standard errors cluster-robust at the
level of the region.
α2 is the coefficient of interest which describes the change in an outcome such as
average employment of a firm located in the treated region with respect to the control
region due to the presence of at least one operational SEZ. Depending on our analysis
of the formal or the informal sector, our expectations differ about the effect that SEZs
are bound to have on firms. For formal sector firms, we expect positive productivity
spillovers that encourage production, and boost investment and employment. We also
expect an increase in wages paid by the formal firm due to the increase in productivity
as well as greater demand for labor. For firms in the informal sector, we expect a
priori that the increase in labor demand and wages in the formal sector may lead
to a reduction in sustenance-level self-employment with workers moving to formal
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firms that are expanding, paying more and offering greater job security. The increase
in demand for local goods by SEZs could also motivate more productive firms in
the informal sector to pay the cost of being regulated and gain from the increased
profitability of being formal. This would result in a reduction in the overall size of
the informal sector in terms of employment, assets and production.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Effects on Formal Firms in the non-SEZ economy
To study the changes in an average firm in formal manufacturing, we use a 9-year
district-industry panel and follow specification 2.1. Column 2 of Table 2.3 shows us
that every additional operating SEZ results in a 2.2% increase in an average formal
firm’s production, accompanied by a 1.5% increase in asset usage and 1% increase
in employment. Labour productivity, both average and marginal (i.e. wages paid),
experience a significant increase of 1.8% and 1.2% respectively. Assuming a constant
returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function, this would point to an increase
in total factor productivity between .7 % and 1.2% depending on the value of output
elasticity of capital.17
Note that the presence of an additional notified SEZ (the values of which are presented
in Table B.3) also seems to positively impact firm investment and the wage level.
This is consistent with us observing increases in NTL upon SEZ notification which
we hypothesize could be due to an increase in demand for activities related to the
17α in Y=A(K)α(L)1− α where A, K and L are total factor productivity, capital and labour
respectively.
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development of an SEZ as well as the anticipation effect of a bigger customer base
for firms in the future. This would induce a greater demand for labour and capital,
reflected in the increase in wage and investment.
In order to distinguish between direct effects on firms beginning production within
SEZs and spillovers on firms outside the zones, we explored the effects of SEZs on
firms in different employment size bins- size 1: (0,10), 2: [10,20), 3: [20,100), and
4: [100,.). We do this because all firms within SEZs must necessarily belong to the
registered sector. So we may just be capturing the effect of their presence in column
2 of Table 2.3. Since we are mainly interested in spillovers, the size-wise analysis
helps us check if effects are just concentrated among larger firms, which are more
likely to be firms within SEZs than the smaller ones. From the rest of Table 2.3, we
see that this is not the case. The small firms with employment under 20 also seem
to benefit from significant increases in production and investment in districts treated
with an additional operating SEZ. One plausible reason we do not notice an increase
in employment among size 1 and 2 firms could be because previously unregistered
informal firms join these bins, finding it profitable to register themselves in order
to establish supply linkages with SEZ firms and workers. This would pull down the
average size of formal firms in the under-20 category because the switchers are likely
to be small (due to the 10-worker rule for registration under the Factories Act). Firms,
regardless of size, experience increases in average labor productivity and pay higher
wages as they become more productive and increase their demand for labor.
We also find evidence of every additional operational SEZ instigating a 1% increase
in the proportion of new firm formation across size categories, implying that firm
formation is not only restricted to large, newly operating SEZ firms. We additionally
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resolve the concern that the positive spillovers we observe in Table 2.3 come only
from these newly formed firms rather than old, already existing firms in the districts.
Table 2.4 splits the samples into firms that are older than 4 years (i.e. older than
the announcement of the SEZ Act of 2005) and those that are not. Every additional
operating SEZ has a strong effect on new firms, especially with respect to production
and productivity. Put differently, the presence of an additional operating SEZ stimu-
lates the formation of new firms that are 18.6% more productive and pay 5% higher
wages. Interestingly, the effects of SEZs on old firms are also positive and significant,
albeit lower in magnitude. Old firms, existing before the SEZ policy came into force,
also experience an increase in productivity and wages of .4%, expand in employment
by 0.9% and show signs of production and investment expansion of 1.3% with every
additional SEZ operating in their district. The stronger effects on new firms is rea-
sonable considering that new firms are probably direct results of SEZs coming into
districts and have the flexibility to adopt the latest technology or best practices right
upon formation and do not face the inertia that old firms may face in changing or
upgrading production methods to increase competitiveness.
2.4.2 Effects on Informal Firms in the non-SEZ Economy
Our analysis of the informal sector highlights the opposite effects SEZs have on the
formal and informal portions of the economy. Columns 1 and 3 of Table 2.5 exhibits
the values of coefficient α2 from specification 2.3 with district, industry and year fixed
effects, and Columns 2 and 4 instead employ district-industry fixed effects and year
effects. The presence of at least one operational SEZ in a district has made the average
informal manufacturer experience a halving of value-added and total production and
a decrease in asset usage by 32% compared to a firm located in a district without an
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operational SEZ. The firms also shrink in size with respect to employment by about
20%. Since the average number of workers in these firms is 3.9, this would imply the
exit of 0.78 workers from a firm on average. Labor productivity, as measured by gross
value added or production per worker, and average wages paid are also negatively
impacted with almost a halving of wages paid to an average worker in the treated
district relative to the control.
While the presence of an SEZ seems discouraging to unregistered manufacturing firm
activity, Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.5 show that the negative influence does not
extend to the unregistered service sector. Here we observe an almost equal and op-
posite trend, especially in firm-level investment and employment. This is in line with
the expectations of big push models such as the one formulated by Magruder (2013)
which expect most of the formalization to happen in the tradeable and industrial-
izable sectors such as manufacturing. In the case of manufacturing, the tradability
factor results in firms facing greater pressure of losing business to those outside the
region if they did not cope with productivity increases of competitors or demand for
higher quality products. Also, since manufacturing is generally industrializable ( i.e.
production is scalable at an industrial level), informal manufacturing may be crowded
out when its formal sector counterpart receives a big push in productivity and de-
mand. Since services are not often industrializable and tradeable, increases in local
demand has to be satiated by local service firms, both informal and formal. Hence it
is reasonable to expect that the informal service sector does not face crowding out as
in the case of informal manufacturing due to SEZ presence.
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2.4.3 Aggregate Effects on the Dual Economy
We analyze the informal and formal sectors within the same empirical framework by
considering two pre-treatment years and one post-treatment year for the formal sector
analysis instead of the annual data. We then use the totals within a district-industry
cell of production, investment and employment in formal and informal sectors as
outcomes. The results derived from specification 2.3 are shown in Table 2.6.
While the formal sector in any 2-digit industry in a treated district experiences a boost
of 46% in production, 37% in investment and 18% in employment, the informal sector
of the same district-industry group experiences opposite effects of a larger magnitude
in all the three parameters. The gains to labour productivity in the formal sector
is also accompanied by an even greater loss in the informal sector. Just as in the
firm-level results, we observe that total activity within informal services expands
significantly unlike in informal manufacturing.
Given a productivity distribution within the informal sector, its decline as observed
in Tables 2.5 and the second panel of Table 2.6 could be driven by the movement of
firms at the both ends of the distribution. The most productive firms are likely to
switch out of the unregistered sector in order to gain from the increase in demand for
goods generate by SEZs, which would explain the decrease in average productivity
and total output in the informal sector. Alternatively, they could be shutting down
if they fail to cope with the increased competition from the expanding formal sector.
Informal sector crowding out could also happen due to less productive firms shutting
down because the workers no longer have to resort to subsistence activites (forced
informality) with more job opportunities in services or formal manufacturing.
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From the bottom panel of Table 2.6, we provide evidence of movements of resources,
in terms of workers and firms, between the formal and informal sectors of treated
district economies. Using the NSS worker-level surveys, we observe an 8.2% decrease
in the proportion of workers employed in small household manufacturing businesses
that are generally less productive, providing some support for a reduction in forced
informality. Correspondingly, the worker-level survey also indicates that the worker
composition in the formal sector, as proxied by the 10-worker rule, rises by 7.9% in
treated districts over control districts. The last two columns in the bottom panel use
the Economic Census to analyze changes in firm counts in districts- both in the total
number of firms as well as the number of informal firms, proxied by the ten-worker
rule. A 21.1% decrease in the number of informal firms in treated over control districts
accompanied by no significant change in the total number of firms also corroborates
the story of increased formalization brought about by SEZs in the local economy.
In the next Chapter, I weigh the relative importance of two channels- informal firm
deaths versus increased registrations into the formal sector- in explaining this tend of
SEZ-driven economic formalization.
2.4.4 Effects on the Overall Wage Distribution
Figure 2·3 uses worker-level survey data and reveals the results of quantile regres-
sions on worker wages in the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile of income
distribution. While the average wage level in a district treated with at least 1 SEZ
increases by 17.9% as depicted by the green line, we clearly see that the wage in-
crease is not uniform across the distribution of workers: workers in the upper end of
the distribution gain the most, with the 90th percentile wage earners experiencing
the maximum wage increase of around 42%. There is no significant increase in wages
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among workers in the lower end of the wage distribution, with the 10th percentile
workers in treated districts even appearing to experience a decrease in wages, albeit
statistically insignificant.
Table 2.7, which also uses worker-survey data, shows that this pattern is driven
by increases in formal sector wages in both manufacturing and services as well as
increases in the returns to higher education. Workers who have above secondary
school level of education (junior college and above) experience a wage increase of
66% between 2005 and 2010. Workers with lower education levels do not seem to
gain significantly in terms of wages. This is consistent with the generally accepted
positive correlation between education and formality of occupation, and with the fact
that SEZs increase wages in the formal sector and not in the informal sector.
Interestingly, we also observe a slight but significant decrease in the proportion of
people in treated districts that are educated below the primary level, the results of
which are in Table 2.8. This could be interpreted as a result of in-migration of more
educated workers in order to take advantage of the higher paying labor market in
treated districts. While data limitations prevent us from directly testing movements
of workers across the education or skill spectrum, there is some support for a general
increase in population density in areas treated with operational SEZs from the analysis
of NTL per population in Chapter 1. Given the short period of analysis, it is less
likely that the effect could be due to the local population being driven to invest in
higher education.
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2.5 Concluding Remarks
We show that SEZs did not only benefit firms locating within them but also produced
local economic spillovers which reflected at the aggregate level of a district. We
show evidence for positive productivity spillovers and firm expansion in the formal
manufacturing sector, as well as for crowding out of the informal manufacturing
sector. Thus SEZs seem to have driven a structural transformation of the economy
towards greater formalization.
The results are especially striking because of the nature of the Indian SEZs which
are smaller and privatized compared to those in other countries. However, the non-
uniform gains in wages among workers serves as a caution about low-skilled workers
losing out when spatial development policies are implemented. These lessons could
be useful for implementing such programs in other developing countries that share
similar political and economic realities.
While we do not carry out explicit cost-benefit calculations, our work prompts ques-
tions about the cost effectiveness of the SEZ policies. Cost-benefit calculations of
such programs in the past show mixed results. While Busso et al. (2013) estimate net
moderate benefits to the development of Empowerment Zones, Chaurey (2016) casts
a doubt in the case of the New Industrial Policy Scheme that the increase in reported
profits could come from either a true increase in production or simply more truthful
reporting. The paper also does not take into account the influence on informal sector
workers, who could be losers in this policy as shown in our research. In our case, a
cost-benefit analysis is trickier to carry out because of difficulties in calculating the
cost of foregone tax revenues. Tax holidays are directed at a much smaller subset of
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firms and not to all firms in a particular state or census tract, in which case weighted
survey data on income cannot be used, as is done in Shenoy (2016), in conjunction
with the tax rate to calculate a tax bill. The focus of this paper is hence on an
evaluation of the the benefits side, leaving the estimation of the cost-effectiveness of
this venture as work for future papers.
Another interesting future area of research is to compare benefits across the different
types of zonal development programs launched by the Indian government in recent
years. The recently launched National Investment and Manufacturing Zones (NIMZs)
differ from the SEZs in some important ways, being mainly state-led initiatives, not
offering complete tax holidays and also being centers for domestic as well as export-
oriented production. These differences could lead to different outcomes, and it would
be interesting to compare the effects of the different zonal development styles and
draw conclusions on the optimal design for the Indian context.
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Figure 2·1: Testing Strength of Identification: Using NTL
(a) Notified SEZs that became operational
eventually
(b) Notified SEZS that did not reach opera-
tion
Note: Figures (a) and (b) compare 5 kilometer neighborhoods around SEZs that have
begun operation before 2013, and those that have been notified but not yet operational by
2013. The year before operation is the base year. Cell and year fixed effects are included.
95% confidence intervals are generated based on spatial HAC errors with 30 kilometer
cutoff.
55
Figure 2·2: Testing for Pre-trends in District-level Manufacturing Outcomes
(a) Actual Trend: Production (b) Linear Fit: Production
(c) Actual Trend:Total assets (d) Linear Fit: Total assets
(e) Actual Trend: Employment (f) Linear Fit: Employment
Note: Treated districts: Those with at least one operational SEZ before 2011. Control districts: Those with at least
one notified SEZ, none of which are operational before 2011. Production, assets and employment are means across
district totals, in logged values. Standard errors for differences in trend in parantheses.
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Figure 2·3: Impact on the Wage Distribution
Note: Figure shows the percentage change in monthly wages, from quantile regressions
of logged worker wages (10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentile), in treated districts
relative to control districts. District, 2-digit industry and year fixed effects included,
standard errors are clustered at the district level and reported in parantheses. *p<0.05,
**p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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Table 2.1: Falsification Test: Impact on Districts before SEZ Notification
Eventual Number of SEZs:
Operating Notified
(γ) (δ)
Production 0.009 0.023
(0.03) (0.02)
Assets used 0.004 0.032
(0.03) (0.02)
Employment 0.015 0.006
(0.01) (0.01)
Labour Productivity -0.002 0.016
(0.02) (0.01)
Wage 0.015 0.005
(0.02) (0.01)
· Results from specification 2.2.
· Industry and year fixed effects included
· All outcome variables are average logged firm-level variables in
the formal sector of a district-industry group
· Errors clustered at district level, in parantheses
· Source: ASI data on formal manufacturing firms (2000-2005)
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Table 2.2: Comparison of Pre-Treatment Averages Across Districts
Variable Control Treated Other Districts
Demographics
Density(/sq. Km) 4059 3988 431.8
Primary and Below (%) 66.8 61.7 74.8
Higher Secondary and Below (%) 95.8 92.4 97.4
Worker Composition
Formal Employment1 0.21 0.27 0.16
HH Employment 0.47 0.46 0.57
Manufacturing 0.67 0.59 0.28
Trade 0.11 0.13 0.03
Services 0.15 0.22 0.05
Agriculture 0.07 0.06 0.64
Firm Composition
Formal Firm1 0.07 0.03 0.01
Firms with No Hired Workers 0.38 0.40 0.64
With Power 0.40 0.34 0.24
Average Firm Size 6.20 3.60 2.41
Manufacturing 0.14 0.16 0.2
Services 0.36 0.32 0.24
Trade 0.47 0.49 0.39
Income
Monthly Earnings (Rs.) 1263.1 1665.5 934.5
Districts 28 40 167
Year of Earliest Formal Approval 2006.96 2006.125 -
Year of Earliest Notification 2008.44 2006.707 -
Year of Earliest Operation 2012.3 2008.317 -
· All values recorded in 2005 (or 2001 in the case of Census variables)
· 1- Value 1 if firm employs over 10 workers, 0 otherwise
· Source: ASI, NSS Employment Unemployment Surveys,
NSS Unorganized Manufacturing, Economic Census,
Census Digital Library, Ministry of Commerce & Industry
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Table 2.4: Effect of Additional Operating SEZ on New vs. Old Formal Firms
Full Sample Old New
α1 α1 α1
Production 0.022** 0.013*** 0.185***
(0.011) (0.004) (0.044)
Assets Used 0.015* 0.013* 0.015*
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
Employment 0.009** 0.010*** -0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.028)
Labour Productivity 0.018* 0.004** 0.171***
(0.011) (0.002) (0.041)
Wage 0.012*** 0.004*** 0.051*
(0.003) (0.001) (0.028)
N 122624 105454 17170
· Old: defined as firms 4 years or older
· Industry, district and year fixed effects included
· Errors clustered at district level, in parentheses
· * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
· Source: ASI Data (2000-2009)
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Table 2.5: Impact on the Informal Sector
Manufacturing Services
Dependent Variable Mean (1) (2) Mean (3) (4)
Production 73967 -0.765*** -0.826** 71264 0.243 0.177
(0.26) (0.38) (0.151) (0.25)
Gross Value Added 18657 -0.578*** -0.646*** 38715 0.228** 0.213
(0.18) (0.24) (0.108) (0.18)
Assets used 200938 -0.401*** -0.419** 106424 0.423** 0.444
(0.14) (0.19) (0.194) (0.30)
Employment 3.9 -0.192** -0.157 1.8 0.182*** 0.192*
(0.08) (0.11) (0.060) (0.10)
Gross Value Added per worker 4836 -0.372*** -0.452*** 21216 0.044 0.022
(0.12) (0.17) (0.084) (0.14)
Labor Productivity 18506 -0.545*** -0.618** 39054 0.058 -0.017
(0.20) (0.30) (0.122) (0.20)
Wage 3064 -0.574*** -0.626** 1586 0.412** 0.435*
(0.17) (0.25) (0.168) (0.24)
N 59233 59233 42056 42056
· All means in Rupees, except for employment reported in numbers
· Dependant variables listed in column 1 are at the firm-level and in logged values
· Main RHS variable is indicator for district treated with at least one operational SEZ before 2011
and corresponding coefficient (α2) reported from specification 2.3
· Columns 1 & 3: District, industry, year fixed effects included
· Columns 2 & 4: District- industry, year fixed included
· standard errors clustered at district level, in parantheses
· * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
· Source: NSS Unorganized Manufacturing & Services
Table 2.6: Impact on Total Economic Informal and Formal Activity
Formal1
Production Employment Investment Wage Labor Productivity
Manufacturing 0.385*** 0.166** 0.316** 0.130*** 0.214**
(0.12) (0.08) (0.14) (0.04) (0.08)
Informal
Production Employment Investment Wage Labor Productivity
Manufacturing -0.694*** -0.278* -0.416** -0.574*** -0.545***
(0.237) (0.149) (0.163) (0.17) (0.20)
Services 0.605* 0.555* 0.732* 0.412** 0.058
(0.356) (0.288) (0.382) (0.168) (0.122)
Overall
Household Emp Emp in Firms>10 No. Firms2 No. Informal Firms2,3
Manufacturing -0.082** 0.079** 0.078 -.238*
(0.036) (0.036) (0.463) (0.137)
Services -0.039 0.056** 0.117 -.200**
(0.034) (0.022) (0.414) (0.103)
· Row headings are the dependent variables, district-industry totals, in logged values
· Regressions are carried out separately for manufacturing and service sectors
· Cells report α2, coeffecient on main RHS variable,· Indicator if district is treated with an operational SEZ before post-treatment year, from specification 2.3
· 1-post treatment year for formal sector analysis at district level up to 2009, Informal sector and worker level analysis up to 2011
· 2-Analysis using the Economic Census data with post treatment year 2012
· 3-Informality defined according to the 10-worker rule
· standard errors clustered at district level, in parantheses, district industry and year fixed effects included
· * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
· Source: ASI, NSS (Unorganized Manufacturing & Services, Employment survevy), Economic Census
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Table 2.7: Drivers of Wage Effect
Worker Characteristics (Education)
(., Primary] (Primary, Higher Secondary] (Higher Secondary,.]
Manufacturing α2 -0.203 0.153 0.512**
(0.264) (0.194) (0.21)
Mean Wage (Rs) 906.9 1772.2 5486.2
N 15388 6686 9727
Services α2 0.340 -.041 0.394**
(0.296) (0.137) (0.19)
Mean Wage (Rs) 1465.6 2565.7 6310.7
N 5167 6962 8531
Firm Characteristics (Size/Formality)1
Informal Formal
Manufacturing α2 0.111 0.407***
(0.28) (0.13)
Mean Wage (Rs) 1510.2 2697.3
N 5746 5314
Services α2 0.022 0.329*
(0.13) (0.17)
Mean Wage (Rs) 1737.1 4722.1
N 8909 8189
· 1- Firm considered formal if it employs greater than 10 workers, otherwise informal
· Dependent variable is logged wage
· Separate regressions run for sectors formed from every combination of row and column headings
· α′2s, coefficients on indicator from equation 2.3,· District, industry and Year FE, errors clustered at district level
· standard errors in parantheses
· * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
· Source: NSS Employment Unemployment Surveys
Table 2.8: Effect of SEZs on Composition of Educated Workforce
Proportion of workers with α2 N Mean Proportion
Below Primary -0.054* 303055 0.59
(0.03)
Below Secondary -0.034 303055 0.92
(0.04)
· Main dependent variable: indicator if worker has below primary, and below secondary education
· α′2s, coefficients on indicator from equation 2.3,· if district is treated with an operational SEZ before 2011, are reported
· District-industry and Year FE, clustered at district level
· standard errors in parantheses
· * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
· Source: NSS Employment Unemployment Survey
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Chapter 3
Understanding the Effect of Indian Special
Economic Zones on the Informal Economy
3.1 Introduction
Substantial economic resources in developing countries are concentrated in the unreg-
ulated, or informal sector. In the case of India, the informal sector employs roughly
86% of the labor force, runs parallel to the formal economy across all industries (even
within narrowly defined categories) and is characterized by low productivity.1 Greater
formality is considered more desirable for long-run development as it brings a larger
part of the economy under beneficial government regulation,2 broadens the tax base,
and enables firm growth and productivity through greater access to credit and tech-
nology.3 There is a growing interest among policy makers and economists to study
factors that influence the growth of firms out of the informal sector. Factors such as
registration costs (Ulyssea (2010), de Mel et al. (2013), de Andrade et al. (2013)),
1 Mukhim (2011) estimates that the informal sector contribution to the Net Domestic Product
in India is 39.5% in manufacturing and 46.9% in services.
2in matters such as quality control and worker welfare
3In the Indian context, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) calculate a potential gain in overall economic
productivity of around 40% due to a shift of resources from the less productive informal sector.
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unit labor costs, corruption in regulation (Amirapu and Gechter (2014)), access to
credit (Banerjee and Duflo (2004)) and the constrained supply of skilled labor (ILO
(2014), Sabarwal (2013)) have been found to have some explanatory power.4
I study the Indian Special Economic Zones (SEZ) policy, a prominent place-based
industrial policy, which seems to instigate a structural transformation of the econ-
omy, increasing firm size (in terms of production, employment and investment) and
productivity in the formal sector while crowding out production and causing a shift of
resources, both labor and capital, out of the informal sector.5 While this show-cases
the potential of such industrial policies in bringing about long-term development, un-
derstanding why and how the informal sector declined can help direct policy towards
specific areas, industries and workers that are particularly affected. The findings in
this chapter contribute to a deeper understanding of how large-scale development
policies interact with both the informal and formal portions of the economy. It pro-
vides novel insights about the differential impact of SEZs on local production chains,
as well as evaluates its effectiveness in stimulating informal firm growth and thus
inclusive development.
Firstly, I evaluate the quality channel of input demand as a plausible explanation for
the crowding out of the informal sector. SEZs, due to their export-oriented nature of
production, are likely to increase the demand for higher quality upstream products
(production inputs). Given that the informal sector does not characteristically pro-
duce high quality products,6 this development likely favors formal over informal firms
4Still others view economic formalization as an organic process which takes place over time as a
country develops (La Porta and Shleifer (2014)).
5refer to the discussion in section 2.4 of Chapter 2
6attributable to the characteristic lack of technology, credit or skilled workers needed to produce
higher quality products
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as input suppliers. Using measures of product quality and an index for the relative
importance of industries in the supply chain, I find that SEZ activity within a district
is indeed correlated with an increase in the demand for quality inputs from the local
economy, which differentially hurts informal industries that are input suppliers.
Secondly, I analyze the nature of the formalization that takes place due to SEZs.
Chapter 2 reveals an increased formalization in the district economy accompanied by
a reduction both in the proportion of workers and firms in the informal sector.7 I
determine if this trend is driven by an increase in informal firms registering into the
formal economy or through firms dying out in the informal economy and new firm
formation in the formal sector. The question is an important one because the two
mechanisms produce different welfare implications. On the one hand, formalization
led by informal firm growth and registration is bound to have positive welfare effects
on wages, poverty and unemployment. On the other hand, formalization could be
driven by informal firms declining due to increased competition. This results in dead-
weight loss and costs related to re-matching capital and workers to productive use,
which are further amplified by the fact that the informal sector is a major employer.8
Using a unique data-set on firm registrations in the state of Tamil Nadu, I establish
that increased formalization in the local economy does not come from a higher rate
of informal firms switching into the formal sector, but rather through their decline.
The methodology used in this chapter closely follows the difference-in-differences
strategy followed in Chapter 2. The main challenge to the identification strategy
comes from the non-random nature of SEZ location. This is a common concern for
7with the total number of workers/firms not significantly altered.
8see Kathuria et al. (2013) and Ulyssea (2010) for a discussion on the risks of higher poverty and
unemployment due to a reduction in informality.
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studies analyzing place-based development policies.9 In order to credibly isolate the
effect of SEZs on the regional economy, I only consider districts in which SEZs have
reached the penultimate stage of approval before beginning operation. This stage
ensures that both the districts and the developers possess qualities that make the
project viable- the government signals its approval of the developer’s detailed busi-
ness plan, and the developer signals keenness in the region and his commitment to the
plan by completing the purchase or rental of land. This takes care of the first-order
concern that the targeted districts may be different, for example in terms of potential
for growth, than other parts of India. The analyses of pre-trends in relevant outcome
variables drawn from varied sources such as nighttime lights data and annual formal
sector firm data conducted in Chapter 2 as well as in this chapter, further confirm
the comparability of districts that have operational SEZs to those that are expected
to in the very short run.
I first test for non-uniform effects among informal firms that produce for the local
consumer and those that are potentially linked to more distant markets through the
input supply chain. To do so, I use a triple differences approach where I interact a
measure of forward linkages in Indian industries constructed by Briand and Hoseini
(2015) with the district-level treatment indicator which conveys the presence of at
least 1 operational SEZ by the post-treatment year.10 I find that the presence of SEZs
is strongly and negatively correlated with the size and productivity of the informal
sector in industries that are traditional input suppliers. For example, the informal
sector in the wood and wood products industry declined in production by 22.6%
relative to the informal sector in the furniture industry in treated districts relative to
control districts. Similarly the wood and wood products industry in districts with at
9Due to private sector participation in program location, we face the opposite concern of studies
generally involving zones in developed economies which usually target under-industrialized regions.
10which varies with the data-set
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least one operational SEZ faces an additional decline of 12.7% in investment, 5.9% in
employment and 18.2% in wages compared to the furniture industry.
I also search for evidence of quality upgrading among formal sector firms that could
have instigated the above differential effects on informal firms, by using the same
framework. I construct three measures of product quality adapted from the trade
literature using the formal firm-level survey data- the unit value of production, white
collar wage level and the ratio of white-to blue-collar wages. I find evidence of higher
average product quality, as measured by these three variables, in districts treated
with operational SEZs, with the positive effects being stronger for products in indus-
tries that are relatively important input providers. To illustrate, the wood & wood
products industry experiences an increase in unit value of production of 13.1%, an
increase in supervisor wage and white collar wage ratio of 1.1% over the furniture
industry.
To address the question about how formalization is brought about, I use a unique
data-set on the universe of firm registrations within Tamil Nadu, a major state for the
SEZ policy to learn if there is a significantly higher rate of informal firm registration in
districts treated with an SEZ. I compare the proportions of informal firm registrations
in districts that have earlier operating SEZs to those that will also have operating
SEZs by 2011. I establish that the presence of at least 1 SEZ in a district is associated
with a dampening effect on the proportion of informal firm registrations of around 18
percentage points. The dampening effect is stronger among firms in relatively more
forwardly-linked industries- the proportion of informal firms among registering firms
declines in the wood & products industry by 5.4% more than the furniture industry in
districts with at least 1 operating SEZ. Analyzing the data on actual counts of firm
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registrations, the dampening is driven by significantly lower number of registering
informal firms in districts with operational SEZs and not the count of new formal
firms.
This paper contributes to the limited but growing empirical literature on the linkages
that exist between the informal and formal sectors of developing economies. In doing
so, the paper provides additional insights on the heterogenous nature of the relation-
ship between different parts of the informal sector and the formal economy. While
I use the forward linkage index as the main source of heterogeneity to differentiate
among informal sector firms based on their position in the supply chain, other works
have studied different slices of the informal sector such as the differences in the behav-
ior of capital intensive vesrus labor intensive informal firms (as in Marjit (2003)), or
informal firms that differ in the skill and productivity levels of their workers (Boehme
and Thiele (2012)), those that produce tradeable versus non-tradeable goods (Ghani
et al. (2015)), those that can be classified as being forced into informality versus those
that are voluntarily in the unregistered sector (Maloney (2004) and Lachaud (1990))
etc. I use the forward linkage index to highlight the effects that SEZs can have on
local supply and demand linkages- one of the channels through which agglomeration
can affect the wider economy. This differentiation is useful not only in the analysis
of supply linkages as in my paper, but can also be used for analyzing fiscal linkages
as done in Briand and Hoseini (2015) who study the effects of introducing the Value
Added Tax on upstream informal firms.
The finding that informal sector in more forwardly linked industrial groups shrinks
due to an increase in demand for quality inputs is consistent with the theoretical
prediction and empirical findings that there are substantial supply linkages between
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the informal and formal sectors of a developing country’s economy.11 Apart from
highlighting the informal-formal supply linkages, the result also provides evidence of
the “dual” nature of the finished goods market i.e. the informal sector producing
for a different market of consumers (likely poorer, with lower demands for quality)
than the formal sector. This is consistent with the finding that less forwardly linked
informal firms are less negatively affected by SEZs since their demands come from a
local, and most likely poorer, end-consumer.
Furthermore, my paper analyzes the changes in the dependence on the informal
sector across the production supply chain brought about by the presence of SEZs.
In this, the result is comparable to that of Ghani et al. (2013) who find that higher
international competition (through trade liberalization) reduces the dependence of
the economy on informal input suppliers. This is also consistent with the findings of
Kathuria et al. (2013) who study policy reforms such as industrial de-licensing, tariff
reduction and removal of reservations in production. They find rising productivity
differentials between informal and formal sectors due to the resultant increase in
international competition as well as domestic competition between the formal and
informal sectors of the economy. Similarly opposite wage effects produced by the
SEZ policy reiterates the dampening role played by greater competition on activity
within the informal sector.
The paper’s exploration of the quality channel to explain the opposite effects on the
formal and informal sectors of production also ties in with the literature connecting
quality upgrading, via increasing international trade, with higher inequality. The
11see Ranis and Stewart (1999) for modeling the informal-formal sector relationship on input,
output and fiscal linkages. Empirical works have established the role of the informal sector as
input supplier (Boehme and Thiele (2012), Mukhim (2011), Ghani et al. (2013)), or source of sub-
contracted labor (Ghani et al. (2015), Moreno-Monroy et al. (2012), Maiti (2008)).
70
channel of quality upgrading drives wage differentials between exporting and non-
exporting firms. As informal firms are certainly not exporters, they can be assumed
to occupy the lower end of the productivity spectrum in the theoretical framework
of Verhoogen (2008). The paper finds that within-industry inequality in wages rises
when more productive exporting firms undergo quality upgradation in order to in-
crease the export share of their products. My results can be viewed in this framework
as the increase in local firm exports (to SEZs) drives an increase in the proportion of
quality, export-oriented production and higher wages awarded to skilled workers in
the formal sector. This could result in lower skilled workers being left behind in the
informal sector thus driving up wage differentials across the informal-formal sectors
and also crowding out input supply linkages with the less productive informal firms.12
The analysis of the trend in informal firm registrations provides novel insights into
informal firm decisions that are usually hard to observe due to the lack of appropriate
data. Data on registration decisions is usually gathered from field experiments such
as in the cases of de Mel et al. (2013) and de Andrade et al. (2013) and thus cover
a very small and specific sample of firms. The data-set used in this paper is, on the
other hand, a complete enumeration of all firm registrations across manufacturing
and services in a large and economically important state in India. This offers an
opportunity to understand how SEZs affect firms’ decisions to register across sectors
and in different parts of the state.
The observation of higher registrations due to lower costs and regulatory supervision
provides additional evidence of the wedge in labor costs which Amirapu and Gechter
(2014) establish as a strong correlate of informality. The result is also in contrast
12Acemoglu et al. (2015) is a related work that discusses demand side shocks transmitted to
upstream firms.
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to the findings of La Porta and Shleifer (2014) and Rothenberg et al. (2016) who
do not observe any increase in registrations among informal firms when faced with
the prospect of costless registration. Possible explanations for the divergent findings
could lie in the experimental nature of the evidence gathered in their case, as well
as their consideration of policies that make only the registration costless without
decreasing the cost of being regulated (for example, facing higher rigidities in hiring
and firing workers).
The result that formalization due to SEZs is not led by increased informal firm reg-
istrations is of policy interest since this sector is a major employer. It is also in
line with the findings of Kathuria et al. (2013) who similarly conclude that economic
reforms such as industrial de-licensing do not encourage informal firm registrations
but rather makes them increasingly lag behind in performance.13 Hence, forces that
increase competition in the local economy, such as the policies studied by Kathuria
et al. (2013) as well as the SEZ policy, seem not to be engines of inclusive, pro-poor
growth. Ulyssea (2018) also finds that policies encouraging formality, if punitive on
the existence of the informal sector, could lead to increased formalization but at the
cost of higher unemployment and poverty.
The findings in this chapter highlights the ineffectiveness of popular development
tools such as SEZs in stimulating inclusive growth and prompts further questions on
how to achieve a re-allocation of resources to more productive use when a large part
of it is in the informal sector.
13through finding no significant difference in the proportion of working population employed by
the informal sector
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3.2 Data Overview
For the measurement of an industry’s degree of importance in the input supply chain,
henceforth referred to as forward linkage, I use the Forward Linkage (FL) index
constructed by Briand and Hoseini (2015) for Indian product and service groups. For
every 2-digit industry group, I aggregate, through simple averaging, the FL index
values of the 43 manufacturing product groups into the 22 2-digit National Industries
Classification (NIC) system which is used in the national data-sets on informal and
formal manufacturing firms in India.
The FL index increases in the proportion of an industry n’s production used as inputs,
both directly and indirectly:
FLi = 1 +
N∑
k=1
αik ∗ yk
yi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct Input Use
+
N∑
k=1
N∑
j=1
αikαkj
yj
yi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect Usage as Input through 1 industry
+... (3.1)
This equation describes the share of industry i’s output that goes to all other in-
dustries (N in total) to be used as intermediate inputs. αik is the number of units
of industry i’s product needed to produce 1 unit of industry k’s product and is de-
rived from the national input-output tables.14 The first summation describes the
total proportion of sales of industry i that goes to all other industries as direct in-
put. The term within the second summation accounts for industry i’s indirect sales
to industry j through industry k which uses i’s products as direct inputs. Similarly,
the use of industry i’s products as indirect inputs through 2 or more industries is
included in the other summation terms not listed. The FL index hence measures the
14The Indian Input-Output tables cover production in both the informal and formal sectors.
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increase in output of industry i that is needed to cope with an increase in output of
all other industries by their relative size to industry i, that rely on its output directly
or indirectly.
The greater the value of FL for industry i, the bigger the role it plays in the national
supply chain. Put differently, the FL index measures the distance to the end consumer
especially in the context of the informal sector, which does not typically trade in
goods. Informal firms in industries with low FL values imply that they cater to
highly local consumers. On the other hand, higher FL values increases the likelihood
that the end consumer is national or international. Figure 3·2 shows the distribution
of formal sector firms by the extent of their forward linkages. The median value is
2.12 (for the printing and publishing industry). The distribution varies slightly in
the informal sector with a lower median value of 1.77 , indicative of a slightly higher
concentration of informal firms in less forwardly-linked, and more local consumer-
facing industries.
Table 3.1 lists the NIC industry groups considered in the study along with their
computed FL values. The values range from 1.12 for the Tobacco industry, whose
products are used least in an input supply chain, to 5.68 for the Basic metals industry,
which serves a variety of industries, both directly and indirectly, as an input supplier.
To understand if there are differential effects to industries in the informal sector
according to the extent of their forward linkages, I use the quinquennial National
Sample Survey (NSS) on unorganized (i.e. informal) manufacturing firms. Each
survey round in my study (2000, 2005 and 2010) contains information on around
35000 firms in the districts of my interest. I aggregate firm-level information on
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production, investment, employment and wages to the district-(2-digit) industry level
and match it with the data-set on forward linkages.
To further shed light on the quality channel of demand which may drive differential
effects in the informal sector, I use the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) and study
the impact of SEZ presence on different measures of production quality. The ASI
is an annual survey of firms in manufacturing that are considered formal i.e. those
registered under the Factories Act.15 It comprises of a complete enumeration of firms
above a 100 in worker strength with an annual survey of a repeated random cross-
section of smaller firms. The data set covers around 30000 firms in the districts of
interest annually from 2000 to 2009.
From this firm-level data, I use information on total value of sales and quantity
of production within 4-digit industry groups (after synchronizing the 4-digit group
classifications to account for changes in codes over the years) to calculate the average
unit value of products produced within each group.16 The unit value is correlated
with product quality and has been used as a quality measure in the literature.17
Other measures of product quality that are commonly used in the literature, such as
in Verhoogen (2008), are white-collar worker wages (as a proxy for the demand for
more productive or skilled labor) and the wage ratio of white- to blue-collar work-
ers. Verhoogen (2008) shows that when there is a sharp increase in the demand for
15Registration under the Factories Act is required for firms above 10 workers if the unit uses
power, and above 20, if not. This is also the standard definition of formality adopted by researchers
on the Indian economy.
16The 4-digit industry is much narrower than the 2-digit industry classification shown in Table
3.1 and allows for calculations of unit values over a smaller range of goods
17especially in the trade literature. See for example, Hallack (2004), Hummels and Klenow (2005)
and Brooks (2003). The exact relationship could be non-linear since unit values can also decrease
with increasing quality if production efficiency and competition are taken into account.
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exports , firms in the local region concentrate more of their resources into producing
export-quality goods thus increasing the usage of more productive workers i.e. skill
upgrading.18 This results in higher wages for white-collar workers relative to blue
collar workers. SEZ activity in the region is analagous to an increase in demand for
export-quality products due to its export-oriented nature of production. To pick up
on such trends in the formal sector of the Indian economy that is exposed to SEZs,
I use firm-level data available on wages paid to supervisors and workers to proxy for
white collar and blue collar wages.
Table 3.2 presents summary trends of the relevant measures within the formal sector
which could be used as measures of quality. Median values are reported along with
mean values due to the high standard deviations of the distributions of employment,
wages, unit value and average production per worker. While both the average wages
paid as well as wages paid to supervisors increase over the years19, there is a relative
increase in supervisor wages compared to worker wages as shown by the rising wage
ratio trend, from 3.2 in 2005 to 4.3 in 2009. Firms in the formal sector also seem to
expand in size between 2005 and 2009, both in terms of blue- as well as white-collar
employment, as can be seen by both mean and median values of total employment.
The unit values of products experience a greater increase between 2005 and 2009
than between 2001 and 2005. This could be a sign of increasing production quality.
The last row also indicates almost a tripling in median average labor productivity in
formal firms from 2001 to 2009. The table hence gives us a glimpse into increases
in productivity, skilled and un-skilled employment and wages, as well as increases in
18a similar increase in demand for skilled labor among Argentine exporting firms is documented
by Bustos (2011), who was also able to proxy for worker skills with actual education levels rather
than wages.
19wage data for 2001 has a lot of missing values, hence the years considered in Table 3.2 for wage
data are 2003, 2005 and 2009.
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prices as measures by unit values, occuring in the formal sector over the period of my
study.
To study how increased formalization is brought about in districts treated with SEZs
(higher rate of informal firm registrations versus new formal firm formation), I focus
on SEZs in the state of Tamil Nadu due to the availability of a unique data-set
on annual firm registrations that allows us a deeper look into the movements of
informal firms within the state. Other data-sets on the Indian informal sector are
available at low frequency, as the NSS surveys, and do not allow for such a study of
firms movements from the informal to the formal sector. Even though the data-set
obtained covers only the state of Tamil Nadu, one among the seven states in this
study, it must be noted that the state hosts a significant proportion of the nation’s
industrial activity, including SEZ development. It contains 58 (24.5% of total) notified
SEZs, 30 of which operate before 2011 (22.6% of the total) with SEZs located in 53
villages/towns (22.5% of the total) over 13 districts (20% of the total).20
Table 3.3 shows the distribution of SEZs in Tamil Nadu. On average, 2.6 operating
SEZs and 4.46 notified SEZs are present in a district among the districts in my
study. The district with the maximum number of both operational and notified SEZ
is Kanchipuram (17 and 27 respectively). As a robustness check for the upcoming
analysis, I also present results that exclude Kanchipuram.21 Out of the 13 districts,
10 districts have at least 1 operational SEZ before 2011. 2 other districts start SEZ
operation in 2011, and the last one in 2013. Hence Tamil Nadu is a particularly
20To further justify the Tamil Nadu-focused analysis that follows, I re-do the analysis on aggregate
movements in the formal and informal sectors attributable to operational SEZs, carried out in Table
2.6 of Chapter 2, with only data on Tamil Nadu instead of the full sample of 68 districts across 7
states. The results, discussed in Table C.2, reflect similar trends in the impact of SEZs on the formal
and informal sectors when only the districts of Tamil Nadu are considered.
21presented in the Appendix section C
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successful case of SEZs transitioning from notification to operation. In the larger
sample including other states, we found that only 30% of the control districts ever
received an operational SEZ eventually. While it is true that the post-2011 withdrawal
of the Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) exemption played a dampening role, all the
districts in Tamil Nadu went on to have at least one operational SEZ.22
The data-set, which is an annual record of all firm registrations in this state between
2000 and 2016,23 is obtained from the Tamil Nadu Directorate of Industries. Firm-
level information includes industry, employment, location down to street level,24 year
of initial production and year of registration. Out of the 389400 firms registering into
the formal sector in Tamil Nadu between 2000 and 2011, 170776 firms registered in
the 13 districts that received SEZ notifications. From the information on the years of
initial production and registration, I classify all firms registering at least a year after
beginning production as old informal firm registrations. Those firms that register in
the same year as their initial production are identified as new formal firms.
We can immediately observe a general pick-up in firm registrations after 2006 among
new formal firms as well as old informal firms from Figure 3·1. The increase is sharper
for informal firm registrations. Consequently, registrations of informal firms formed
a higher proportion of total registrations, an increase from an average of 41% of total
registrations before 2006 to 61%, after. This increase is plausibly due to the ease in
the administrative procedure brought about by the introduction of the Micro, Small
and Medium Enterprises (MSME) Act. Between 2000 and 2006, firms registered ei-
22This could be due to the advanced stages in construction of notified SEZs within the state.
23I utilize the data up till 2011, since the SEZ policy changed significantly afterwards
24There were many cases of non-street level addresses with village-level information also missing
or unclearly coded. Only 30000 of the 170000 firms in the registration data-set could be matched to
a village, allowing for the analysis to be done at the district level with the full sample
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ther via the Factories Act or as Small Scale Industries (SSI), both registrations being
considered as entries into the formal, registered sector. In 2006, with the introduc-
tion of the MSME Act, the registration process for firms was significantly simplified.
Business owners could now fill forms online, called the Entrepreneurs Memorandum,
in order to register with the state. Along with this, the MSME Act also significantly
reduced the regulatory supervision that formal firms were subjected to. In addition
to this policy change, another factor that could have encouraged the rising trend
in informal firm registrations was the introduction of the Value Added Tax (VAT),
which has been verified by Briand and Hoseini (2015) to have encouraged registra-
tion among forwardly-linked informal firms. However, both policies were applied to
all districts in the state, and my district-level analysis will still effectively reveal the
additional effects of SEZ activity on firm registrations over and above the ones caused
by the state-level policy changes.
3.3 The Quality Channel of SEZ Influence
3.3.1 Empirical Strategy
The main identification strategy is similar to the one adopted in Chapter 2. I use the
the approval process of SEZs as a source of quasi-experimental variation and compare
regions in which there is at least one SEZ that has passed notification (the control
group) with those that have at least one operating in them (the treated group). The
exact set of regions that fall into treatment and control categories differ according to
the sector analyzed. For the informal sector analysis, the post-treatment period is
2011 and hence includes more districts in the treated group (40) than in the case of
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the formal sector analysis (29), whose post-treatment period is 2009.
Since the main framework for my analysis is a difference-in-differences one, this cru-
cially requires that the districts considered, both treated and control, follow common
trends prior to the intitiation of the SEZ policy. This is a challenge since such place-
based policies are not randomly located. In the case of developed economies, zones
are usually located in under-industrialized regions. In the Indian context, SEZ de-
velopment, mainly a private sector initiative, targeted regions with a greater degree
of urbanization, human capital quality and profitability. A simple comparison of ar-
eas with SEZs and those without would be unsatisfactory since it will likely violate
the common pre-trends assumption and bias our difference-in-differences estimate of
effects upwards.
To lend robustness to the identification strategy, I use the evidence on treatment-
control comparability drawn from the earlier chapter which uses varied data sources
to conduct levels and trend comaprisons of treated and control districts on the vari-
ables of interest. To summarize the argument put forth in the earlier chapter, I find
that treatment and control districts are closer to each other than to other districts
within the state in terms of density of population, work-force composition (being pre-
dominantly non-agricultural and manufacturing-focused) and targeted within compa-
rable time-frames by SEZ developers. The lag in SEZ notification in control districts
are also found to be more due to developer- or project-level factors such as financing
issues or the delay in land acquisition than the lack of promise in control districts as
viable locations for SEZs. To support this, Section 2.3 also uses nighttime lights data
to find no evidence of pre-trends in general economic activity in 5 kilometer neighbor-
hoods around SEZs that began operation and those that passed notification and were
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yet to begin operation by 2013. An analysis of trends in formal sector employment,
production and investment using the ASI data also showed no significant differences
between treated and control districts.
In addition to the justification used in Chapter 2, I again use the annual ASI formal
sector data to analyze pre-trends in logged unit values for industries that are above
and below the median in the distribution of forward linkages, as well as logged su-
pervisor wages. As can be seen from Figure C.1, districts considered as treated and
control seem to follow similar trends in product values and wages till 2006. I also
conduct falsification tests i.e. I test if there are any differential changes in product
unit values, supervisor wages and wage ratios due to the presence of operational and
notified SEZs, even before they located within the districts:
log(yfidt) = α0 + αi + βt + γ ∗No.EventuallyOperatingSEZsd
+ δ ∗No.EventuallyNotifiedSEZsd + εidt (3.2)
The outcome variable yfidt takes the logged values of quality measures related to an
average firm f in 2-digit industry i in district d at time t:. The main regressors are
the number of eventually operating and notified SEZs that the district receives after
2005. Since the analysis is over the time period between 2000 and 2005 (before the
announcement of the SEZ Act.), the corresponding coefficients, γ and δ , should not
show any significance and I find this to be true. The result can be found in Table C.1
.
Given the supporting evidence for the identification strategy drawn from varied
sources of information, I analyze the differential effects that SEZs may have on in-
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dustries within formal and informal manufacturing using three main frameworks.
Firstly, I divide the set of industries (i=1,..,N) into those with above (fli=1) and below
(fli=0) median values of the forward linkage index.
25 Interacting this indicator with
the 3-period difference-in-differences specification used to analyze movements in the
aggregate economy (specification 2.3 in Chapter 2) I can analyze any heterogeneity
related to the nature of the industry of the firm:
yidt = α0 + α1Td + α2fli1AFTER + α3fliTd + α4Td1AFTER
+ α5fliTd1AFTER + λt + λi + λd + uidt (3.3)
yidt measures the logged outcome variable
26 of a 2-digit industry i in district d at
time t. Td is the treatment indicator for a district having at least one operational
SEZ before the post-treatment year.27 A value of 0 implies the district has at least one
notified SEZ before the post-treatment year, but none as yet operational. The time
indicator 1AFTER takes the value of 1 for the post-treatment year. Td and 1AFTER are
interacted with each other and with fli for the above triple differences specification.
28
The main coefficient of interest is α5 which measures the additional effect on the
logged outcome variable in treated over control districts, due to the industry being
relatively more forwardly-linked. For outcome variables measuring the size of the
informal sector in industry i, I expect α5 to be negative and draw my hypothesis
25in this, I use the median value of the formal sector distribution.
26such as total production, employment, investment and average wages in the informal sector, and
measures of product quality in the formal sector.
27In the 3-period framework, it is 2009 for the formal sector and 2011 for the informal sector due
to the nature of the ASI and NSS data-sets.
28The variable fli is subsumed by industry-level fixed effects and is thus not included in specifi-
cation 3.3.
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by comparing the SEZ policy to the Indian trade liberalization episode discussed
in Ghani et al. (2013). They find a decreased dependence on the informal sector
for inputs following liberalization and attribute it to the environment of increased
competition which drives firms to seek better quality inputs. Similarly, firms within
SEZs are export-oriented and can also be expected to demand higher quality inputs
from the local economy to keep up their international competitivenes, resulting in a
greater crowding out of informal sector activity in more forwardly linked industries.
For outcome variables that proxy for product quality and which are constructed from
the formal sector data as described in section 3.2, I expect the the sign on α5 to be
positive since it is reasonable to assume that, in the short run at least, the demand for
higher quality falls on firms producing intermediate inputs to an expanded customer
base of SEZ firms, than the final consumer/wage earner. Given, however, that the
presence of SEZs raises the wages in the formal sector and especially for people with
higher education/skill levels (as shown in Chapter 2) product quality is likely to
increase across the spectrum of goods in the medium to long run.
An alternate empirical framework to analyze the impact of the quality demand chan-
nel is a full interaction of the industry-wise FL index:
yidt = α0 + α1FLiTd + α2FLi1AFTER + α3FLiTd1AFTER + λt + λi + λd + uidt (3.4)
FLi is a continuous measure of forward linkages for industry i as calculated from
Equation 3.1. Td and 1AFTER take on the same meaning as in the earlier specification.
If the dependent variable is logged total production in the informal sector in industry
i in district d at time t, given an interquartile range of x for the FL distribution, α3∗x
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will measure the additional change in total logged production in the 75th percentile
industry in the FL distribution compared to the 25th percentile industry in the FL
distribution in treated districts. Similar to the previous specification, I expect a
negative value for α3 in the case that the outcome variable measures informal sector
size in industry i and a positive and possibly significant value for α3 when the outcome
variable is a measure of product quality.
A third framework uses the annual variation in the number of operating and notified
SEZs in districts as well as the annually available formal sector firm data to measure
the effect of every additional operating SEZ in a district on the average level of
product quality in an industry:
yidt = α0 + α1FLiNo.Operatingdt + α2FLiNo.Notifieddt + λd + λt + λi + idt (3.5)
The main independent variable is FLiNo.Operatingdt which is an interaction of the
FL index for industry i and the number of operational SEZs in district d by time t. I
control for the (industry-wise) effect of the number of notified but not yet operational
SEZs in d at time t, FLiNo.Notifieddt, district, time and industry fixed effects
and cluster the errors at the district level. Given an interquartile range of x for the
distribution of forward linkages, α1∗x, indicates the additional change in the measure
of product quality in the 75th percentile industry in the FL distribution compared to
the 25th percentile industry in the FL distribution with every additional operating
SEZ in the district. Again, I expect the sign on α1 to be positive.
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3.3.2 Results
Table 3.4 displays the impact on informal sector size and wage levels due to the
presence of at least one operational SEZ in a district before 2011. Panel I shows the
results from specification 3.3. The coefficient on Td1AFTER (α4) indicates that the
informal sector industries that are less forwardly-linked than the median value in the
FL distribution, experience a strongly negative effect in treated districts relative to
control- production declines by 46.7%, investment in plant and machinery by 33%,
employment by 15.5%. This is accompanied with a decline in informal sector wages
in fl=0 industries of around 31%.
The triple differences coefficient on fliTd1AFTER, α5, is as expected negative for all
4 outcome variables, but significant at the 0.01 level only for wages. This provides
some evidence for the extra negative effect of SEZs on the size and productivity
of the relatively more forwardly linked industries which comprise the fl=1 group of
industries.
Panel II displays the coefficient on FLiTd1AFTER from specification 3.4 which uses
the continuous FL index and interacts it with the district-level treatment indicator
for SEZs. Here it is clearer that the negative effects on informal sector size and
productivity are felt in industries that play a greater role as input suppliers than
consumption good producers. The interquantile range of the FL distribution in the
informal sector is 0.81 and the 75th and 25th percentile industry in the FL distribution
are wood products and the furniture industry respectively. From column 1, I then infer
that the wood and wood products industry declined in production by 22.6% relative
to the furniture industry in treated districts relative to control districts. Similarly
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the wood and products industry faces an additional decline of 12.7% in investment,
5.9% in employment and 18.2% in wages compared to the furniture industry.
Table 3.5 displays the results for the impact on quality measures such as product unit
value, white collar wages (as proxied by supervisors’ wages) and the ratio of white
to blue collar wages (as proxied by the ratio of supervisor to worker wages). Panel
I shows the results for specification 3.3. The coefficient on Td1AFTER, α4, for the
regression with logged unit value as outcome variable indicates that the unit value of
products from industries in the formal sector that are less forwardly-linked than the
median value in the FL distribution, experiences a 28.8% reduction in product prices
compared to the control district. This could be also due to the fact that production
efficiency or competition can reduce prices/unit values and may not be an indicator
of a reduction in quality. The signs on other quality measures, supervisor wages as
well as supervisor-to-worker wage ratio, are however positive. The triple differences
coefficient on fliTd1AFTER, α5, is as expected positive for all three measures of quality,
and significantly so for unit value and supervisor wages. The unit value of products
produced in fl=1 industries experienced an increase of 17.8% in treated districts. The
wage level of supervisors in fl=1 industries increased by 5.6% over that of the fl=0
industries in treated districts. Given the short time period of analysis, especially for
the formal sector where the post-treatment year is 2009, the positive and significant
values of α5 is in line with the hypothesis that quality upgrading has first-order effects
on firms that are important input suppliers rather than those that produce finished
goods since the demand for the latter depends on wage effects.
Panel II displays the coefficient on FLiTd1AFTER from specification 3.4 which uses
the continuous FL index and interacts it with the district-level treatment indicator
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for SEZs. Here it is clearer that the positive effects on quality measures are stronger
in industries that play a greater role as input suppliers than consumption good pro-
ducers. Following the interpretation of the coefficients for Panel II of Table 3.4, the
furniture industry experiences an increase in unit value of production of 13.1%, an
increase in supervisor wage and white collar wage ratio of 1.1% over the wood & wood
products industry, in treated districts.
Panel III, which displays the coefficient on FLiNo.Operatingdt also provides evidence
of higher increases in quality as measured by unit value and supervisor wages in more
forwardly linked industries with every additional operating SEZ in a district. The
furniture industry seems to experiences a 0.9% increase in unit values over the wood
& products industry and a 0.2% in supervisor wages with every additional operating
SEZ.
From the analysis of informal sector size and quality measures from the formal sector,
I do find some evidence for the quality channel of demand driven by the presence of
SEZs, which exerts a stronger negative effect on informal firms that were traditionally
input suppliers than final output suppliers. This is also evidently accompanied by an
increase in product quality produced in the formal sector. In the short run at least,
it seems that the quality effects are stronger in industries that are characteristically
input providers.
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3.4 Informal Sector Decline: Increased registrations versus
Shutting down
3.4.1 Empirical Strategy
While the quinquennial NSS surveys constrained the regression framework to com-
paring treated districts (those that got an operating SEZ before 2011) to a control
group (those that had notified SEZs before 2011), a more robust study is plausible
with the annual registrations data on informal firms.
Firstly, I study changes in the proportion of informal firms in total firm registrations
that occur in districts through time, before and after they receive their first operating
SEZ. This event-study framework throws light upon the time pattern of SEZ influence
and can reveal if pre-trends in registration patterns are an issue for concern:
Switcheridt =
k 6=−1∑
−11≤k≤5
γk ∗Ddkt + αi + αd + αt + idt (3.6)
where the outcome variable,Switcheridt, is the proportion of registering/switching
informal firms in industry i and district d at time t. A binary variable Ddkt takes the
value of one if the earliest operating SEZ in district d has been operating for k years
in time t. Year 0 is the initial year of operation of an SEZ. District, industry and year
fixed effects are included and standard errors are cluster-bootstrapped at the district
level.
The estimates of interest are γk’s, for k ∈ [−11, 5]. This range covers the possible
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ages of SEZs in the time period of the data-set, 2000 to 2011. γk can be interpreted
as the change in proportion of switching informal firms in district d, k years since the
operation of its earliest SEZ, relative to the year before its operation (γ−1 is normal-
ized to 0). If SEZs encourage informal firm registrations, γk would be positive and
its magnitude potentially increasing in k after the initial year of operation, indicating
persistence in the effect of operating SEZs. Based on the results of the previous chap-
ters, it is unclear whether the SEZ policy encourages formalization through increased
informal firm registrations or through increased activity in the formal sector (through
newly formed formal firms as well as expanded activity in old formal firms).
Crucially, I do not expect any significant trend in γk prior to SEZ operation since I
do not expect regions to be affected by an SEZ even before it establishes its presence.
A significant pre-trend would reduce the reliability of the results of the following
analyses.
I use the following difference-in-differences framework which is useful in making com-
parisons across sub-samples (for example, across industry groups):
Switcheridt = α0 + α1Operatingdt + λt + λi + λd + idt (3.7)
The main independent variable is a time-varying treatment indicator, Operatingdt,
which turns from 0 to 1 in the year the district receives its first operating SEZ. The
comparisons are thus being made among districts that receive at least one operating
SEZ before 2011. The outcome variable,Switcheridt is the average proportion of
switching informal firms among total registrations in a district d and 2-digit industry
i at time t. District, industry and time fixed effects are added to the specification
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and standard errors are cluster-bootstrapped at the district level.
The coefficient of interest, α1, captures the average additional change in the pro-
portion of registering informal firms in the years after SEZ operation relative to the
years before. A positive (negative) value for α1 implies that the presence of at least 1
operating SEZ in a district on average increases (decreases) the probability that the
registering firm is an old informal firm. This information throws light on the asso-
ciation SEZs may have with the rate of informal firms transitioning into the formal
sector.
An alternate framework incorporates the varying number of SEZs in districts and
across time in the following regression framework:
Switcheridt = α0 + α1No.Operatingdt + α2No.Notifieddt + λd + λt + λi + idt (3.8)
The main independent variable is No.Operatingdt which indicates the number of op-
erational SEZs district d by time t. I control for the number of notified but not
yet operational SEZs in d at time t, No.Notifieddt, district, time and industry fixed
effects and cluster-bootstrap the errors at the district level. The coefficient of in-
terest, α1, indicates the change in proportion of old informal firms registering in a
district with every additional operating SEZ in the district. Again, the sign on α1 is
ambiguous ex-ante, given the results so far.
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3.4.2 Results
Figure 3·3 shows the results from the event study of districts receiving their earliest
operating SEZs and its impact on informal firm registration rates. It shows a clear and
persistent decrease in the proportion of informal firm registrations after the beginning
of SEZ operation, relative to the year before operation. The proportion of informal
firm registrations to total registrations declines by 0.2 in the first year of operation of
the earliest SEZ. The decline is persistent through the years of SEZ operation. In five
years of the first SEZ’s operation in the district, the informal firm registrations decline
in proportion by 0.78 compared to the year before operation. This indicates that SEZs
have a dampening effect on informal firm movements into the formal sector. Figure
3·3 also shows that in the years prior to the operation of the earliest SEZ, there is no
evidence of significant pre-trends in informal firm registrations. This adds robustness
to our findings for the difference-in-differences specifications.
Table 3.6 shows the results of specification 3.7. The first column shows results for
all the registering firms in the districts in consideration, the second column focuses
on registrations in the manufacturing sector, the third and fourth columns analyze
the sub-sectors within manufacturing which are relatively less and more forwardly
linked than the median forward linkage index of 2.12. The 5th column analyzes the
sub-sectors with interactions added to specification 3.7 instead of sample splitting.
Finally, the last column analyzes service sector registrations. The bottom panel
displays the coefficient on a full interaction of the FL index with the Operating
indicator, FLi ∗Operatingdt.
From the coefficient on Operatingdt across columns, it can be inferred that there is
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a general decrease in the proportion of informal firms among the registering firms
in the years after a district is treated with at least one operating SEZ. On average
the proportion of informal firms among the registering firms decreases by 18 per-
centage points. This negative trend in informal firm registrations holds for both
manufacturing and services (columns 2 and 6). While the fourth column suggests
that the decrease in the proportion of informal firm registrations in manufacturing
comes mainly from the more forwardly linked industries, column 5 does not provide
sufficient evidence to that effect.
The bottom panel, with the full set of interactions, however shows that the wood and
products industry experiences a 5.4% decrease in the proportion of informal firms as
registrants than the furniture industry in treated districts. There is hence evidence
that SEZs have a dampening effect on the proportion of informal firm registrations
which are otherwise on the rise in districts after 2006. There is also moderate evidence
that this dampening effect is greater among firms that are in the more forwardly linked
industries.
Table 3.7 displays the marginal effects on district-level counts of registering firms-
both old informal as well as new formal firms due to the operation of at least 1 SEZ
in a district.29 Using a negative binomial regression framework, I regress the count
of switching firms and new formal firms in a district on the Operatingdt indicator as
defined in specification 3.7, district and year fixed effects, a control for the increase in
registrations post-2006 (1t>2006), and cluster-bootstrap the errors at the district level.
All else equal, when atleast one SEZ begins operation in a district, the registrations
of old informal firms reduces by 541 firms and this reduction is significant at the .05
29When analyzing counts of registering firms within district groups, I notice that the distribution
of counts is over-dispersed and the assumption of normal distribution of errors is improbable. I
assume instead a negative binomial distribution as the underlying distribution for the counts data.
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level. While the registrations of new formal firms upon SEZ operation also reduces
by 62 firms, this difference is not significant when tested. Hence the decrease in the
proportion of informal firm registrations is driven more by the decrease in the number
of informal firms registering in districts with operating SEZs.
I find similar patters of a decreasing proportion of switching informal firms per every
additional operating or notified SEZ in a district in the framework of specification 3.8
as displayed in Table 3.8. In general, the proportion of old informal firms registering
decreases by 3.2% points with every additional operating SEZ in a district. This
dampening effect is evident across manufacturing and services. The bottom panel
again displays the coefficient on a full interaction of the FL index with the main
independent variable, FLi ∗ No.Operatingdt. With every additional operating SEZ,
the proportion of informal firms among registering firms declines in the wood &
products industry by .8% more than the furniture industry.
Robustness Check
I re-do the analysis in Tables 3.6 and 3.8 after dropping Kanchipuram which hosts
17 operating SEZs and 27 notified SEZs to determine if the effects are driven mainly
by this intense (99th percentile) activity. Table C.3 shows that the results from
specification 3.7 are reduced in magnitude but survive the removal of Kanchipuram.
The proportion of registering informal firms decreases by 13.4% in districts after
the operation of at least 1 SEZ compared to before. From the fourth column, it
also appears that the negative effects are stronger and significant for more forwardly
linked industries.
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Removing Kanchipuram removes the significance of the results in Table C.4 and alters
the magnitudes (see Table C.4). This is plausibly because Kanchipuram drives the
results behind the No.Operatingdt variable in specification 3.8 while specification 3.7
does not take the intensity of SEZ activity within districts into account.
3.5 Conclusion
I find evidence of quality upgrading in the production of districts treated with Special
Economic Zones, especially in the production of those goods that are more important
as inputs. Correspondingly, the section of the informal sector that is involved in the
production of these forwardly-linked goods shrinks more in districts with SEZs. This
points to a decreased reliance on the informal sector for inputs due to an increase in
the demand for quality inputs.
Interestingly, SEZs seem to dampen the trend in informal firms switching to the formal
sector. This, taken with the results in Chapter 2, implies that the dominant channel
of formalization in treated districts is not the increased growth and registration of
informal firms, but rather the relative decline in informal firms and expansion of
formal firms. Perhaps the channel at play is the absorption of more productive
workers from the informal sector into already existing or new formal firms, leading to
the shutting down or stagnation of existing informal firms.
If the results from Tamil Nadu can be generalized, this raises the concern that lower-
skilled informal workers, especially in industries that predominantly produce inputs,
are left out of the growth story. While the expanding formal sector skims off the most
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productive workers in the informal sector thus spurring a more efficient reallocation of
resources to the more productive formal sector, future policy design needs to look into
how existing informal firms, who are major employers, can be supported to grow into
the registered sector, thus bringing wage benefits to a larger section of the work-force.
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Figure 3·1: Firm Registration Trends in Tamil Nadu, by firm type
Note: Figure depicts registrations in the 13 districts considered, trends similar
when the whole of Tamil Nadu is considered. Source: Tamil Nadu Directorate of
Industries.
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Figure 3·2: Distribution of Firms across Industries: by extent of Forward Linkages
Note: Distribution covers firms within the formal sector (source: ASI).
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Figure 3·3: Event Study: Patterns in Informal Firm Registrations
Note: Figures plot change in proportion of switching informal firms (γ′ks in spec-
ification 3.6). The year before operation of earlierst SEZ in district, year -1, is
the base year. District, industry and year fixed effects are included. 95% con-
fidence intervals are generated based on standard errors clustered at the district
level. Source: Tamil Nadu Directorate of Industries.
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Table 3.1: Measurement of Forward Linkages for 2-digit Industry Groups
NIC 2-digit Industry Groups Product Groups
Forward
Linkage (FL)
Index
Basic Metals Non-ferrous basic metals 5.68
Chemicals & prod Fertilizers, paints, inorganic & organicheavy chemicals,pesticides, drugs 3.50
Paper & products Paper & products 3.12
Coke & petrol products Coal tar, petroleum products 2.62
Fabricated metal products Metal products 2.53
Wood & products Wood & products 2.37
Electric machinery
& apparatus
Electrical & electronic machinery
& appliances 2.34
Non-metallic mineral products Non-metallic mineral products 2.29
Plastic & rubber products Plastic & rubber products 2.21
Other transport Rail equipment, other transport 2.19
Office & computing,
communication,
medical equipment
Other machinery, miscellaneous
manufacturing products 2.16
Machinery & equipment Industrial machinery, other machinery 2.14
Printing & publishing Printing & publishing 2.12
Leather tanning,leather goods Leather & leather products 1.82
Textiles cotton textiles; wool, silk and synthetictextiles; jute, hemp and mesta textiles 1.77
Motor vehicles Tractors, Other transport vehicles 1.75
Furniture Furniture & fixtures 1.56
Food & beverages Food products, beverages, sugar 1.46
WearingApparel Textile products including wearingapparel 1.39
Tobacco Tobacco products 1.12
· FL Index calculated according to equation 3.1
· Source of product group classification: Briand and Hoseini (2015)
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics: Quality Measures in Formal Firms
2001 2005 2009
Monthly Wage* 1 mean 4121 4541 7443
sd 3671 7775 10052
median 3045 3151 4850
Supervisors Wage* mean 8690 9848 18039
sd 10754 40139 27937
median 6191 6380 10863
Wage Ratio* mean 3.2 3.3 4.3
sd 3.1 8.1 6.8
median 2.4 2.4 2.8
Total Employment 2 mean 168 147 208
sd 592 398 579
median 38 32 51
Supervisors mean 19 18 24
sd 79 76 91
median 4 4 6
Workers 3 mean 119 98 126
sd 469 288 418
median 25 19 27
Product Unit Value mean 38142 36580 50705
sd 133108 131056 161788
median 1894 1117 1375
Production per worker mean 763824 1375345 2321698
sd 1570641 4687736 11000000
median 392644 607884 949168
· Wages, unit values, production per worker in Rupees.
· * Wage data reported for 2003 instead of 2001 due to missing data in 2001
· 1: Average of (directly employed) supervisor and worker wages
· 2: Includes contracted staff, directly employed workers and supervisors
· 3: Directly employed workers only
· Source: ASI data for 2001, 2003,2005,2009.
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Table 3.3: Summary of District-level SEZ Activity in Tamil Nadu
Number of SEZs: Earliest Year of:
Operational Notified Operation Notification
Mean 2.6 4.4 2009.3 2007.61
Std. Deviation 4.5 7.0 2.1 1.1
Median 1 2 2010 2008
Min 0 1 2006 2006
Max 17 27 2013 2009
· Out of 13 districts, 10 have operational SEZs before 2011
· The other 3 districts receive their first operational SEZ in 2011 (2), 2013 (1)
· Source: Ministry of Commerce & Industries
Table 3.4: Differential Effects within the Informal Sector
I. Splitting Industries into above (fl=1) & below (fl=0) median in forward linkages
Dependent Variables (log-transformed)
Production Investment Employment Wage
Td1AFTER -0.630** -0.402* -0.169** -0.371**
(0.274) (0.220) (0.078) (0.162)
flTd1AFTER -0.202 0.415 -0.026 -0.370**
(0.343) (0.258) (0.091) (0.157)
II. Full set of Interactions with FL Index
FLiTd1AFTER -0.317*** -0.167** -0.076** -0.248***
(0.118) (0.081) (0.036) (0.072)
N (District-Industry) 2595
· I: Regression follows specification 3.3
· II: Regression follows specification 3.4
· FLi is the forward linkage value from Table 3.1
· fli=0 for i which is below the median (2.12) of the FL distribution, 1 otherwise· District, 2-digit industry, year fixed effects included
· Std. errors clustered at district level
· * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
· Source: NSS Unorganized Manufacturing Surveys (2000,2005,2011)
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Table 3.5: Effects on Quality Measures
I. Splitting into above (fl=1) & below (fl=0) median in FL
Dependent Variables (log-transformed)
Unit Value Supervisor Wage Wage Ratio
Td1AFTER -0.341** 0.073 0.040*
(0.136) (0.038) (0.023)
flTd1AFTER 0.537*** 0.056** 0.005
(0.159) (0.024) (0.029)
II. Full Interactions with FL Index
FLiTd1AFTER 0.152*** 0.014* 0.013**
(0.048) (0.008) (0.006)
N (firms) 27208
III. Full Interactions with FL Index and No. Operating SEZs
FLiNo.Operatingdt 0.011* 0.003** 0.001
(0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
N (firms) 89403
· I: Regression follows specification 3.3, post-treatment year 2009
· II: Regression follows specification 3.4, post-treatment year 2009
· III: Regression follows specification 3.5
· Wage ratio: Supervisor to worker wages
· FLi is the forward linkage value from Table 3.1
· fli=0 for i which is below the median (2.12) of the FL distribution, 1 otherwise
· District, 2-digit industry (4-digit for unit value analysis), year fixed effects included
· Std. errors clustered at district level
· * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
· Source: ASI (2000-01 to 2008-09)
102
Table 3.6: Effect on Proportions of Informal Firm Registrations in Tamil Nadu- I
Dependent Variable
(I) Proportion of Old Informal Firms Registering in:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent Variable Full Sample Manufacturing fl=0 fl=1 fl=0 vs fl=1 Services
Operatingdt -0.178** -0.163* -.090 -.225*** -0.145* -0.199***
(0.068) (0.076) (.094) (.059) (0.073) (0.058)
fli*Operatingdt -0.050
(0.054)
(II) Proportion of Old Informal Firms Registering (Full Sample)
FLi*Operatingdt -0.068**
(0.031)
N 153199 122848 63632 58661 122293 30351
· Results from Specification 3.7, and versions of it allowing for interactions
for heterogeneity analysis across industry groups with varying levels of forward linkages (FL)
· FLi is the forward linkage value from Table 3.1
· fli=0 for i which is below the median (2.12) of the FL distribution, 1 otherwise· District, 2-digit industry, year fixed effects included
· Std. errors cluster-bootstrapped at district level
· * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
· Source: Tamil Nadu Directorate of Industries (2001-2011)
Table 3.7: Marginal Effects of at least 1 Operational SEZ on Registration Counts
Marginal Effect Switching New Formal Proportion
Operatingdt=0 887.523 505.332 0.546
(320.732)*** (159.743)*** (0.029)***
Operatingdt=1 345.798 443.027 0.371
(109.907)*** (147.926)*** (0.057)***
N 153 153 153
· Results from negative binomial regression of district-level registered firm counts
· Main independent variable: Operatingdt as defined in specification 3.7· District, year fixed effects included
· Std. errors cluster-bootstrapped at district level
· * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
· Source: Tamil Nadu Directorate of Industries (2001-2011)
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Table 3.8: Effect on Proportions of Informal Firm Registrations in Tamil Nadu- II
Dependent Variable
(I) Proportion of Old Informal Firms Registering in:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent Variable Full Sample Manufacturing fl=0 fl=1 fl=0 vs fl=1 Services
No.Operatingdt -.032** -.029** -.029** -.030** -.026** -.054***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (.010) (0.009) (0.017)
fli*No.Operatingdt -.004
(0.004)
(II) Proportion of Old Informal Firms Registering (Full Sample)
FLi*No.Operatingdt -0.010**
(0.004)
N 153199 122848 63632 58661 122293 30351
· Results from Specification 3.8, and versions of it allowing for interactions
for heterogeneity analysis across industry groups with varying levels of forward linkages (FL)
· FLi is the forward linkage value from Table 3.1
· fli=0 for i which is below the median (2.12) of the FL distribution, 1 otherwise· District, 2-digit industry, year fixed effects included
· Std. errors cluster-bootstrapped at district level
· * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
· Source: Tamil Nadu Directorate of Industries (2001-2011)
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Appendix
A Chapter 1
Incentive Package for SEZ Developers and Firms
Table A.1: Benefits to SEZ Developers and SEZ Units
Developers Units
Administrative Single window clearance for Central and State level approval
Tax
Exemption from Minimum Alternate Tax
Exemption from Central and State Sales Tax
Service and Dividend Distribution Tax
Duty-free domestic procurement of goods, services
100% Tax exemption for Year 1-5: 100% tax exemption
10 consecutive years Year 6-10: 50% tax exemption
since SEZ notification Year 11-15: 50% of reinvested profits
Others
Infrastructural support
Upper limit extended for managerial
remuneration, external commercial
borrowings allowed, etc.
Source: Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Government of India
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Timeline of SEZ Approval Procedure
Figure A.1: SEZ Timeline
Note: Figure shows the different stages that SEZs pass through before beginning operation. Refer
to Section 1.2 for detailed stage-wise explanation.
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Pictorial representation of Specification 1.2
Figure A.2: Analyzing the Effects of an SEZ at a Distance of 4 to 5 kilometers
Note: For conducting the 4 kilometer distance ring analysis, we select all cells that have their closest
SEZ between 4 and 5 kilometers, such as the cell whose center is depicted above. We then control
for all the other SEZs, in rings farther away, and in all stages of their life- before they become
notified (period 0), after notification (period 1) and after operation (period 2). Specification 1.2
then isolates the effect of a notified but not yet operational SEZ in the 4 kilometer distance ring
through the coefficient γ4 (the baseline is the effect of a period 0 SEZ in the same ring). Similarly
the effect of an operational SEZ in the 4th kilometer ring is captured by the coefficient δ4, our main
coefficient of interest.
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Figure A.3: Extending Distance Analysis to 20 kilometers
(a) Long-run effect: NTL (b) Short-run effect: NTL
Note: Figures plot .01*percentage change in NTL backed out from δ′xs in specification 1.2
where the analysis extends beyond 15 kilometers and up to 20 kilometers away from SEZs.
The base period is the pre-notification period of an SEZ in distance ring x. Cell and year
fixed effects included. 95% confidence intervals are generated based on spatial HAC errors
with 30 kilometer cutoff.
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B Chapter 2
Table B.1: Treatment & Control Group Formation
Data-set Levelof analysis Pre-treatment Post-treatment Considered set Of which treated:
Economic Census Village/Town 2005 2013 >=1 notified SEZon or before 2012
with >=1 operational
by 2012
NSS Unorganized
Firms District 2000-01, 2004-05 2010-11
>=1 notified SEZ
on or before 2010
with >=1 operational
by 2010
NSS Worker Survey District 2000-01, 2004-05 2010-11 >=1 notified SEZon or before 2010
with >=1 operational
by 2010
ASI Formal
Manufacturing District 2001 to 2005 2006 to 2009 >=1 notified SEZ
total operational & notified
every year
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Table B.2: Summary of Key Variables of Workers and Firms before 2005
mean sd 25th pctl 50th pctl 75th pctl min max
Demographics
Density(/sq. Km) 3989 2606 2279 3597 4845 250 19865
Literacy 63.48 10.60 56.67 63.37 69.68 37.49 83.40
Primary and below 0.59 0.49 0 0 1
Secondary and below 0.92 0.28 1 0 1
Amenities*1
Bank Density 1.50 0.59 1.10 1.37 1.73 0.11 3.22
Primary School Density 3.74 1.60 2.61 3.52 4.71 1.27 10.07
Secondary School Density 1.30 0.59 0.93 1.15 1.58 0.48 3.48
Wage2
Informal Manufacturing 8.5 1.7 7.4 8.1 9.9 3.8 12.5
Informal Services 8.1 1.4 7.3 8.2 9.0 2.0 11.0
Formal Manufacturing 11.0 0.8 10.5 11.0 11.5 4.9 14.2
per capita Consumption2 7.0 0.6 6.6 6.9 7.4 3.3 11.0
Firm Composition
Greater than 10 Workers 0.04 0.20 0 1
Any Registration 0.53 0.50 0 1
Own Account Enterprise 0.41 0.49 0 1
Unincorporated 0.93 0.25 0 1
Operating with Power 0.34 0.47 0 1
No External Finance 0.90 0.30 0 1
Informal Finance—Financed 0.41 0.49 0 1
Firm Size
Formal Manufacturing
Employment3 122.7 596.4 9.0 24.0 114.0 1.0 45481
Average Labour Productivity2 13.7 1.5 12.9 13.8 14.7 0.4 19.9
Informal Manufacturing
Employment 5.4 4.8 2.1 3.7 7.0 1.0 35.0
Average Labour Productivity 10.3 2.4 8.8 9.7 12.2 3.6 15.6
Informal Services
Employment 2.0 1.1 1.3 1.8 2.2 1.0 10.0
Average Labour Productivity 11.3 0.7 10.8 11.3 11.8 7.6 13.7
· All averages are at the district-level, and when possible, at the village-level
· * values as of 2001
· 1 -per 10000 population
· 2 - logged real values
· 3 - in absolute numbers
· Source: Census Digital Library of India, NSS and ASI surveys, EC data
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Table B.3: Effect of Every Additional Notified SEZ on a Firm in Formal Manufac-
turing
Dependent Variable All Firms Size 1: <=10 Size 2: (10,20] Size 3: (20,100] Size 4: >100
(α2) (α2) (α2) (α2) (α2)
Production 0.003 0.017 0.002 0.006 0.004
(0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002)
Assets Used 0.018** -0.010 0.017** 0.020*** 0.001
(0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003)
Employment 0.007 -0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.005***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Labour Productivity 0.002 0.010 0.002 0.003 0.004*
(0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Wages 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.004* 0.005*** 0.020**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
New 0.002*** 0.002* 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 122624 18554 21919 39533 42618
· Dependant variables listed in column 1 are at the firm-level, and enters in logged values
· New- Takes value 1 if firm formed after first SEZ gets notified in the district, 0 otherwise
· Main RHS variable is the number of notified, non-operational, SEZs in the district of the firm in a year
· The respective coefficient α2 is obtained from running specification 2.1
separately for each dependent variable and size category
· District- industry and year fixed effects included with errors clustered at district level
· standard errors in parantheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
· Source: ASI data (2001-2009)
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SEZs’ Influence on Village-level Economic Activity
We follow specification 2.3 at the village level with the Economic Census data. Ta-
ble B.4 reveals a large and significant increase in the total working population and
an economically, if not statistically, significant increase in the number of firms in a
treated village as compared to the control village. We also observe increased hiring
among firms, with average size expanding by 13.5% (which translates to roughly one
additional worker to an average firm) and with the proportion of firms with no hired
workers decreasing by 4.3%. This analysis gives us a preliminary view of an expan-
sion in industrial activity which is consistent with an expansion in NTL recorded over
areas of similar dimensions.30
Table B.4: Village Level Analysis of Firm and Worker Numbers
Dependent Variable Mean α2
Total Firms 330675 0.252
(0.412)
Total Workers 2190081 0.630*
(0.341)
Avg Workers per Firm 6.2 0.135**
(0.055)
Pr(Firms with 0 Hired Workers*) 0.38 -0.043**
(0.020)
N 2497090
· * Also known as Own Account Enterprises (OAEs)
· Errors clustered at village level
· All outcome variables in logged values
· α2 reported as in specification 2.3· standard errors in parantheses
· * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
· Source: Economic Census
30The 5-kilometer neighborhood around an SEZ spans an area of roughly 75 square kilometers,
almost twice the area of a typical village in our study.
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SEZs’ Influence on Sub-district level Population Movements
We use the Gridded Population of the World (GPW) data in conjunction with sub-
district level administrative boundaries.31 The 251 SEZs in our sample are situated
in 126 sub-districts with the number of SEZs per sub-district varying between 1 and
12 (with a mean of 2.02 and a median of 1). We restrict our attention to those with
at least one SEZ notified before 2010 and evaluate whether the ones with at least one
operating SEZ show faster population growth. For sub-district i in district d at time
t:
log(populationidt) = α0 + α1Y eart + α2Districtd + α3Operatingidt (A.9)
+ α4Operatingidt × Aftert + idt,
where Operatingidt = 1 if there is at least one operating SEZ in sub-district i and
Aftert = 1 in year 2010. Standard errors are clustered at district level.
The estimation result reported in Table B.5 suggests that there is no differential trend
of population density growth between the sub-districts whose SEZs started operating
before 2010 and those whose SEZs are only notified by 2010. In other words, it is
not likely that there are population movement across sub-districts. This is consistent
with the fact that Indian labor market tends to be spatially restricted, meaning that
the labor mobility is low.
31Acquired from the Survey of India.
113
Table B.5: Effect of Operating SEZs on Sub-district Population density
Dependent variable Log of population density
Year 2005 0.875***
(0.012)
Year 2010 0.164***
(0.028)
Operating 0.332
(0.374)
Operating × After 0.029
(0.026)
N 321
· District fixed effects are included, and year 2000 is omit-
ted. Standard errors are clustered at district level.
· * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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C Chapter 3
Treatment-Control Comparability
Figure C.1: Pre-trends in Unit Values & Supervisor Wages
Note: Figures plot logged unit values for industries with fl=0 (l) and fl=1 (ll) as well as
supervisor daily wages (lll) between 2001 and 2006. The red lines indicate averages for
treated districts i.e. those that have at least 1 operational SEZ before 2011, and the green
lines indicate averages for control districts i.e. those that have at least 1 notified SEZ
before 2011 but none as yet operational.
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Table C.1: Falsification Test: Product Quality Measures
Eventual No. (SEZs):
Operating Notified
(γ) (δ)
Unit Value -0.040 -0.008
(0.057) (0.016)
Supervisor Wage -0.018 0.033
(0.061) (0.020)
Wage Ratio 0.043 -0.001
(0.080) (0.021)
N 67325
· Regression follows specification 3.2
· Industry and year fixed effects included
· Std. errors clustered at district level
· Source: ASI (2000-2009)
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Impact on Formal and Informal Economy: Tamil Nadu
Table C.2 presents the values of α2 from running the same specification as equation
2.3 in Chapter 2 but limiting the districts to those in Tamil Nadu:
yidt = α0 + α1Td + α2Td1AFTER + αi + αd + βt + εidt (A.10)
yidt is the logged district-2 digit industry level outcome variable. Td is the treatment
indicator which is 1 for districts that were treated with at least one operational SEZ
before the post-treatment period, which varies according to data-set.32 The value is 0
for regions that have at least one SEZ notified before this time but none operational
yet. 1AFTER is the time indicator which takes the value 1 for the post-treatment
period, and 0 otherwise. District, industry and year fixed effects are included with
standard errors cluster-robust at the level of the district.
From the reported α2’s in Table C.2, we can infer that the positive effects on wages
and employment in the formal economy of treated districts are similar to the 7-
state analysis in Table 2.6. The effects are weaker in magnitude but still significant
for formal sector production and investment. The informal manufacturing sector
in Tamil Nadu seems to shrink in size and productivity as reflected by production,
employment, investment and wages with similar magnitude as in the analysis in Table
2.6, but the effects are not significant. The standard errors, however, are small enough
to suggest significance at the 0.1 level if not at the 0.05 level. The same can be said
about the large positive, but non-significant effects on wages in the informal service
sector.
The analysis on the proportions of working population in small household businesses
in Tamil Nadu produces stronger negative effects than for the wider analysis- the
proportion of workers in household businesses shrink in treated districts in Tamil
Nadu by 19.1% compared to 8% in the 7-state analysis. Similarly, the positive effect
on the proportion of workers employed in firms larger than 10 workers is stronger in
the Tamil Nadu analysis (31.5% compared to 8.2%). The analysis using counts of
firms derived from the Economic Census reveals that the number of informal firms
(as defined by the 10-worker rule) decreases by 27%, comparable to the decrease of
21% when all the districts are included. There is also no significant impact on the
total number of firms in treated districts just as in the wider analysis, which leads us
to the conclusion that formalization in Tamil Nadu could either be driven by informal
32specified in the footnotes of Table C.2
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firms registering into the formal sector or by new firm formation in the formal sector.
Given the similar pattern of effects of SEZs on Tamil Nadu districts compared to the
larger pool of districts, using the state’s data to investigate the channel of formaliza-
tion and the role of informal firm registration, is a relevant exercise.
Table C.2: Impact of SEZs on the Economy of Tamil Nadu
Formal1
Production Employment Investment Wage
Manufacturing 0.006*** 0.170* 0.008* 0.130***
(0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.04)
Informal2
Production Employment Wage Wage
Manufacturing -0.366 -0.422 -0.498 -0.404
(0.236) (0.265) (0.321) (0.252)
Services -0.842 -0.329 -0.538 0.576
(0.918) (0.867) (0.881) (0.375)
Overall
Household Emp3 Emp in Firms>103 No. Firms4 No. Informal Firms4,5
Manufacturing -0.212** 0.274*** -0.645 -0.270**
(0.081) (0.075) (0.517) (0.106)
Services -0.156* 0.165** 0.019 -0.342*
(0.080) (0.072) (0.277) (0.203)
· Row headings are the dependent variables, district-industry totals, in logged values
· Regressions are carried out separately for manufacturing and service sectors
· Cells report α2, coefficient on main RHS variable:· Indicator if district is treated with an operational SEZ before post-treatment year, from specification 2.3
· 1- Source: ASI, post treatment year 2009
· 2-Source: NSS Unorganized Manufacturing and Services, post treatment year 2011
· 3- Source: NSS Employment and Unemployment Survey, post treatment year 2011
· 4-Source: Economic Census, post treatment year 2012
· 5-Informality defined according to the 10-worker rule
· standard errors cluster-bootstrapped at district level, in parantheses
· district, industry and year fixed effects included
· * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Robustness check: removing Kanchipuram
As pointed out in section 3.2, the district of Kanchipruam is an outlier which has 17
operating SEZs and 27 notified SEZs by 2011. I drop Kanchipuram from my analysis
and redo the analysis in specifications 3.7 and 3.8:
Table C.3: Effect on Proportions of Informal Firm Registrations in Tamil Nadu- I
Dependent Variable
(I) Proportion of Old Informal Firms Registering in:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent Variable Full Sample Manufacturing fl=0 fl=1 fl=0 vs fl=1 Services
Operatingdt -0.144** -0.115 -.093 -.213* -0.121 -0.194***
(0.067) (0.076) (.088) (.099) (0.072) (0.061)
fli*Operatingdt -0.002
(0.046)
(II) Proportion of Old Informal Firms Registering (Full Sample)
FLi*Operatingdt -0.044
(0.025)
N 137021 108056 57833 49725 28965
· Results from Specification 3.7, and versions of it allowing for interactions
for heterogeneity analysis across industry groups with varying levels of forward linkages
· FLi is the forward linkage value from Table 3.1
· fli=0 for i which is below the median (2.12) of the FL distribution, 1 otherwise· District, 2-digit industry, year fixed effects included
· Std. errors cluster-bootstrapped at district level
· * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table C.4: Effect on Proportions of Informal Firm Registrations in Tamil Nadu- II
Dependent Variable
(I) Proportion of Old Informal Firms Registering in:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent Variable Full Sample Manufacturing fl=0 fl=1 fl=0 vs fl=1 Services
No.Operatingdt .029 .045 .039 .046 .033 .005
(0.034) (0.028) (0.032) (.026) (0.028) (0.030)
fli*No.Operatingdt .017***
(0.004)
(II) Proportion of Old Informal Firms Registering (Full Sample)
FLi*No.Operatingdt .016
(0.010)
N 137021 108056 57833 49725 122293 28965
· Results from Specification 3.8, and versions of it allowing for interactions
for heterogeneity analysis across industry groups with varying levels of forward linkages
· FLi is the forward linkage value from Table 3.1
· fli=0 for i which is below the median (2.12) of the FL distribution, 1 otherwise· District, 2-digit industry, year fixed effects included
· Std. errors cluster-bootstrapped at district level
· * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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